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Preface
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union (EU) committed to reducing green-
house gas (GHG) emissions by 8 per cent compared to the 1990 level in the period
from 2008 to 2012. An obvious way to implement such a reduction target is to
cap emissions at the required level and to issue the respective amount of emission
allowances which may then be traded on a market. Hence, the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was set up to back the Kyoto commitment
with a climate policy instrument (Ellerman et al., 2010). In 2005, the world's largest
cap-and trade scheme was established and at rst covered carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from around 10,000 installations such as power plants, cement or metal
works.1 About 40 per cent of European GHG emissions are regulated under the
EU ETS. Europe can meet most of its Kyoto mitigation goals with the emission
reductions in the EU ETS. Sectors outside of the EU ETS, such as buildings and
transport, need to decrease GHG exhaust to a smaller extent. Currently, national
energy eciency standards or investment programs are in place to pave a low-carbon
path in non-ETS sectors. These sectors may be included into the EU ETS at a
later point, but proposals are not yet on the table. However, the EU ETS was
extended to the aviation sector in 2012, and the number of complying entities rose
to 12,800. Starting Phase III (2013-2020), the allocation mechanism for emission
allowances will change. Until now, the emission rights, so-called European Union
Allowances (EUA), were allocated in so-called National Allocation Plans (NAP) by
the European Commission (EC) and given out for free. Soon the EC will only decide
on the total cap, but not on its allocation, and will auction the respective EUAs
centrally.
1Covered industries are electricity production, other combustion, reneries, coke ovens, metal
ore, iron and steel, cement, glass, ceramics, paper and pulp.
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Market-based instruments, such as emissions trading, are the preferred policy
option as they assure static eciency by yielding abatement at least cost. In an
emissions trading scheme the installations with the lowest marginal abatement cost
reduce their emissions and sell the \freed" emission rights to rms with higher
marginal costs. Given an overall reduction target, the carbon price indicates the
cost-eective solution (Tiedenberg and Lewis, 2008). In the EU ETS least cost
abatement is further promoted by the possibility to comply with credits from abate-
ment activities under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Reduction of
GHG may be cheapest in developing countries, and EU ETS installations may tap
this potential by complying with a certain share of such CDM credits. A more
detailed discussion of the CDM and its link to the EU ETS is provided by Ellerman
et al. (2010) or Linacre et al. (2011).
In addition to static eciency, market-based instruments are said to promote
dynamic eciency in the long-run and thus provide incentives in low-carbon invest-
ments (Tiedenberg and Lewis, 2008). These incentives can only be triggered by a
carbon price that is high enough to make new abatement technologies protable.
Investments in emission-reducing technologies need to be cheaper in the long-run
than maintaining the status quo and buying emission rights. Moreover, investors
have to trust in the stringency and credibility of the policy target. Otherwise,
rms will hesitate and delay investments in low-carbon technologies that are usually
capital-intensive (Hepburn, 2006; Grubb and Newberry, 2008).
After almost eight years of experience with emissions trading in Europe, the
success of this policy instrument can be assessed thoroughly. Clearly, regulated
installations complied with the national emission caps in the past years. Figure 1
shows that veried emissions remained below the cap in most of Phase I (2005-2007)
and Phase II (2008-2012). In 2008, the installations required several allowances more
than originally allocated. However, rms could also surrender some of their 2009
EUAs or CDM credits for compliance. EUA allowances did not become scarce
in the following years { mainly due to generous EUA allocations and a slump in
emissions during the economic crisis. Recent estimates suggest that installations will
be oversupplied with 1.1 billion emission rights by 2012.2 In 2011, only Germany's
installations needed more emission allowances than they originally received through
2Bloomberg, 12. May 2012, EUs Hedegaard says CO2 auctions review is short-term x,
www.businessweek.com.
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their NAP { probably due to strong growth and the nuclear phase-out. In a nutshell,
while an institutional infrastructure to cap and trade emissions has been created in
recent years, the system currently provides few incentives to deviate from business-
as-usual emissions.
Figure 1: Yearly emissions cap and compliance in the EU ETS
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Note: Allocated allowances and veried emissions in Phase I (2005-2007) and Phase II (2008-2012).
Data have been aggregated for the EU 27. Source: www.carbonmarketmonitor.com.
But did the EU ETS trigger abatement? This question is rather dicult
to assess as it requires assumptions about the counterfactual development without
an emission cap. Using patent data, Raphael Calel (2012) nd that the EU ETS
has so far not signicantly encouraged rms to develop new technologies. However,
estimates by Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Grubb and Newberry (2008) indicate
that some additional abatement took place Phase I. One of the most likely forms of
abatement is fuel-switching in the electricity sector as it does not require investments
in new equipment (Ellerman et al., 2010).3 Fuel-switching is based on the idea
that carbon pricing makes electricity generation from coal plants relatively more
expensive than generation from gas because coal combustion exhausts more CO2.
Depending on the relative prices of gas, coal, and carbon, it might be protable to
3Notwithstanding that fuel switching is a cheap form of abatement, Ellerman et al. (2010) object
that the fuel-switching capacity and therefore abatement potential is rather limited.
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switch fuels and burn cleaner gas instead of coal. One has to note that there is
not one switch price but rather a band of switch prices depending on the eciency
of given plants. Figure 2 illustrates one possible switch price and the carbon spot
price for Phase II. When the CO2 price is above the switch price, using less carbon-
intensive gas instead of coal should in theory be cheaper (Clo and Vendramin, 2012).
As depicted in Figure 2, the European carbon price was mostly too low to induce
switching in Phase II.4
Figure 2: Development of switch and carbon price in Europe
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Note: This switch price is calculated on the basis of the month ahead price for coal (CIF ARA) and
natural gas, both traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). This switch price is calculated
for a coal plant with a thermal eciency of 36% and a combined cycle turbine gas plant with an
eciency of 49%. Assumed emission factors are 950 kg CO2 per megawatt hour (MWh) for coal
and 420 kg CO2 per MWh for gas. Source: Datastream and own calculations.
The carbon price in the EU ETS is a crucial parameter in all abatement
decisions.5 It provides incentives to tap the fuel-switching potential, and more
importantly, to invest in low carbon technologies in the long-run. Therefore, under-
standing what drives the carbon price is absolutely essential. This thesis aims to
provide insights into the price development and its determinants. Going from there,
4The assumptions that underly this switch price have been altered as a robustness check. The
conclusion remains that the carbon price was too low to induce switching.
5The European carbon price is in the following also labelled as EUA price.
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implications for the design of the carbon market can be derived. The rst two
chapters shed light into the versatile nature of the carbon price. On the one hand,
the EU ETS was created to serve as a policy instrument and is highly dependent
on cap decisions of the EC that steer supply (Grubb and Newberry, 2008). On the
other hand, carbon has been turned into a commodity that is now embedded into the
existing structure of commodity and nancial markets. The literature has to some
extent identied how these markets interact. One nding is that fuel prices drive the
EUA price (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007; Alberola et al., 2008; Hintermann, 2010).
When coal is cheap, demand for emission rights and their price rises. Hence, coal
is usually reported to be negatively correlated with the EUA price, while natural
gas is positively correlated with the EUA price. Another nding from the existing
literature is that the carbon price inuences the electricity price. Various studies
show that carbon price shocks are passed through to wholesale power prices (Fell,
2008; Zachmann and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Bunn and Fezzi, 2009).
Chapter 1 further investigates the relationship between carbon, commodity,
and nancial markets and yields important insights into their dependence.6 Dierent
copulas are applied to investigate the complex dependence structure between EUA
futures returns and those of commodities, equity and energy indices. Copulas are
a exible method to model the relationship between variables as they account for
dierent types of tail dependence. The application of copulas yields possibly better
insights than the application of linear correlation models only. This chapter's results
illustrate a signicant relationship between EUA returns and the other considered
return series. The dependence is most appropriately modelled by the Gaussian
and the Student-t copula. This contradicts some earlier studies that report no
statistically signicant or even negative correlations between returns of emission
allowances and nancial variables. Furthermore, time-varying copulas show that the
estimated parameters are not constant over time. The dependence is particularly
stronger during the period of the nancial crisis. Finally, a Value-at-Risk (VaR)
6This chapter is joint work with Stefan Truck and Marc Gronwald. The paper has been
published as Gronwald, M., Ketterer, J., Truck, S., 2011. The relationship between carbon,
commodity and nancial markets A copula analysis. The Economic Record 87, special issue,
105-124. For publication in this thesis, I updated Section 1.2.2 and Section 1.3. Where necessary
and appropriate, I corrected the wording of the published text. Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5 are
not included in the nal publication, but in the working paper version: Gronwald, M., Ketterer,
J., Truck, S., 2011. The dependence structure between carbon emission allowances and nancial
markets A copula analysis. CESifo Working Paper, 3418.
xi
analysis can illustrate the advantages of copula methods in an investment context.
The Student-t copula provides an appropriate quantication of VaR at dierent
condence levels while other models fail to specify the risk correctly. Ignoring
the actual nature of dependence could lead to an underestimation of the risk for
portfolios combining EUAs with commodities or equity investments. Hence, the
ndings in Chapter 1 are also relevant for investments which depend on the price
development of multiple commodities, such as gas, coal, and carbon. Once the risk
structure can be better understood and hedged, investments will be more attractive.
The European carbon price is not a pure commodity market given its strong
underlying political inuence. The EUA price cannot be suciently explained by
only investigating the relationship between the EU ETS and the existing structure
of nancial and commodity markets. This is conrmed by Hintermann (2010) who
shows that demand-side fundamentals, such as fuel prices and weather proxies,
provide an insucient explanation of the EUA development in Phase I. To capture
the carbon price in an appropriate way, the regulatory framework and related
decisions on the supply of emission allowances should be included in a carbon price
model.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the inuence of the political arena on the carbon
price.7 In a rst step, the application of a combined jump-GARCH model illustrates
that the behaviour of the EUA price is characterised by large price movements.
The results show that between 40 and 60 per cent of the carbon price variance is
triggered by jumps. In a second step, a database of regulatory events in the European
carbon market is compiled. It shows that these regulatory events help to explain the
identied carbon price jumps. Decisions on EUA supply and news from international
carbon markets are particularly important drivers of sudden price movements. New
regulation places market participants in a changed environment and related price
reactions seem quite abrupt. These results can assist regulators the way if the
outcome of smoother carbon prices is desired. The EC should avoid imprecise
debates on future policy that introduce uncertainty. A clear communication strategy
should be adopted that conveys information about the long-term reduction target
and the policy strategy. It is certainly dicult to nd a balance between exibility
7Chapter 2 is based on joint work with Marc Gronwald. Our paper has been published as
working paper Gronwald, M., Ketterer, J., 2012. What moves the European carbon market? {
Insights from conditional jump models. CESifo Working Paper, 3795. Chapter 2 includes an
additional regression analysis in Section 2.5 which is not part of the original paper.
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and commitment when designing the carbon market. But credible policy targets
and rules are a condition to stabilise the carbon price and carbon price expectations
that trigger investments in low-carbon technologies. Discretionary policy steps and
a deviation from the announced reduction path might unsettle the carbon market
(Helm et al., 2003). Instead of investing in costly and complex low-carbon projects,
market participants are likely to mistrust the current climate policy and wait until
more information regarding the climate change objective becomes available.
Clearly, policy makers should prevent the carbon price signal from deterio-
rating. However, whilst a stable price signal is necessary to trigger low-carbon
innovation and investment, it may not alone be sucient (Montgomery and Smith,
2007; Hanemann, 2010). The economic literature has long debated whether one
single instrument might be enough to induce mitigation in the long-run. Several
studies conclude that additional market failure related to positive externalities from
research and development (R&D) or principal-agent problems cannot be tackled by
one policy but do justify additional instruments (Jae and Stavins, 1994; Newell,
2010; Acemoglu et al., 2012). When facing climate change, investment horizons
might be too long, projects too expensive and market failures too diverse to be
solved by a single instrument (Hepburn, 2010).
Introducing dierent national and supra-national climate policies is not with-
out problems. A multitude of climate policy instruments can be benecial, but the
policy mix needs to be well-tuned. If combined instruments are not complementary,
the eects can be detrimental (Sinn, 2008; Fankhauser et al., 2010; Monopolkom-
mission, 2011). A straight forward example is the interaction between emissions
trading and renewable support schemes. In most European countries, renewable
energy support has led to a surge in renewable energy capacity. This is good news
with regard to the CO2-intensity of the energy sector. But because the overall
emissions cap remains xed, emission rights, set free in the energy sector, can be
bought cheaply from other sectors. A rough calculation can help illustrating this
eect for Germany. Sensfu (2011) estimates that renewable electricity generation
replaced 83.5 terawatt hours (TWh) of conventional power in Germany in 2010. It
is assumed that 1 kilowatt hour (kWh) conventional electricity produces on average
679 g CO2, given the German conventional electricity mix (BMU, 2012).
8 Therefore,
8Gruet (2011) assume 696 g per CO2 for all of Europe. They estimate that additional wind
power generation reduced 126 Mt in Europe in 2010.
xiii
the additional renewable electricity would have avoided about 57 million tons (Mt)
CO2 in 2010, whereas the total EU ETS cap for Germany was 453 Mt in 2010.
Although this example gives only rough estimates, it becomes clear that substantial
amounts of CO2 can be shifted to other ETS-covered sectors or counties, reduce
demand for EUA allowances, and lower the CO2 price but not the overall emissions.
To assure the eectiveness of interacting policies, renewable energy growth trends
and energy eciency plans need to be reected by the EU ETS cap. Otherwise, the
market is over-allocated as the demand for EUA allowances reduces, and the carbon
price decreases.
Figure 3: Interactions between carbon and energy markets
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Figure 3 illustrates the interaction between the aforementioned markets. First,
the relationship between the carbon and the electricity price has been outlined above
and is further illustrated in Chapter 1. Second and as just discussed, additional
renewable electricity generation reduces the carbon price, given that the cap is not
adjusted.9 Finally, electricity generation from variable renewable energy sources has
a dampening eect on the electricity price.
Chapter 3 of this thesis provides further insight into this relationship and
how renewable power generation inuences the electricity price. More specically,
Chapter 3 evaluates the eect of wind electricity in-feed on the level and volatility
of the electricity price using a GARCH model. Wind electricity is particularly
9Certainly, a high carbon price makes renewables more competitive with conventional energy as
coal becomes more expensive (Saenz de Miera et al., 2008). However, under the current feed-in tari
scheme, renewables do not have to compete as they are subsidised. This eect can be neglected in
the current market situation.
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interesting because its contribution to the German power mix is substantial, but
subject to signicant variation. The empirical results show that this uctuation is
transmitted to the electricity price. Variable wind power on the one hand reduces
the price level, and on the other hand increases its volatility. With a low and volatile
wholesale price, the protability of electricity plants, conventional or renewable, is
greatly reduced. Consequently, the construction of new plants is at risk, which
has major implications for the energy market and the security of supply. The new
challenges with renewables require adjustments to the regulatory and the policy
framework of the electricity market. This chapter's results suggest that regulatory
change is able to stabilise the wholesale price. The empirical investigation shows
that the electricity price volatility has decreased in Germany after the marketing
mechanism of renewable electricity was modied. This gives condence that further
adjustments to regulation and policy may foster a better integration of renewables
into the power system. Going forward, the stability of the electricity price could
be promoted in a dual approach. First, by giving incentives to build exible power
plants that absorb uctuation of wind and solar PV power in-feed. Second, pol-
icy instruments should address the variable in-feed of renewable power itself. As
renewable generation gained ground in power markets, support schemes should be
increasingly dependent on the wholesale electricity price. So far, German feed-in
taris do not vary with the wholesale price. But price-dependent subsidies give
incentives to feed-in during times of high wholesale prices when electricity supply is
needed most. Pursuing both approaches, namely additions of exible capacity and
market-based subsidy payments, smoothes the transition to a low-carbon electricity
market with a stable price and secure supply.
Eorts to reduce GHG emissions in Europe resulted in the creation of a
common carbon market and various national support schemes for renewable energy.
The main focus of this thesis is to explore whether the design of carbon and electricity
markets lead to the desired price signals and emissions abatement. The observations
in both markets point to challenges that question the success of climate change
mitigation. Some of these obstacles could be resolved by better combining policies
in both markets. The EU ETS and renewable energy support overlap to a large
extent and the desired eects of both policies might cancel out. Making the policy
design more coherent is certainly not easy but oers a promising solution.
xv
With respect to emissions trading in Europe, this policy instrument should not
rashly be condemned as non-eective. Instead, its long term goal and perspective
should be sharpened. The future of the EU ETS will certainly be inuenced by
the international climate negotiations. But European policy makers should assure
that the chosen policy path will be further pursued and emphasise which emissions
reductions the EU ETS will deliver after 2020. While the progress towards a global
agreement has been sluggish in recent years, national and sectoral initiatives seem
on the rise with emissions trading schemes being developed in Australia, China,
and the United States. This validates the experience and institutional framework
already provided in Europe. In the long-run, the possibility to link all these schemes
in a bottom-up approach could give a wider perspective and scope to the emissions
trading approach.
xvi
Chapter 1
The Relationship between Carbon,
Commodity, and Financial
Markets - A Copula Analysis
1.1 Introduction
Under the Kyoto Protocol the EU has committed to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions by 8 per cent compared to the 1990 level in the period from 2008 to
2012. To give a price to carbon emissions and to incentivise the reduction of
GHG emissions, an EU-wide CO2 emissions trading system, the so-called EU ETS,
has been set up. The right to emit a particular amount of CO2 has become a
tradable commodity and is now a factor of production that is subject to stochastic
price changes. This new market not only requires regulated emitters to run an
adequate risk management, it also provides new business development opportunities
for market intermediaries and service providers such as brokers or marketeers. It is
essential for carbon market players to learn about price dynamics in order to realise
trading as well as risk strategies and investment decisions.
Since the beginning of the emissions trading in 2005, a number of studies have
analysed the price behaviour of the European Union emission allowances (EUA).
Paolella and Taschini (2008), Benz and Truck (2009) as well as Daskalakis et al.
(2009) provide an econometric analysis of the behaviour of allowance prices and
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investigate dierent models for the dynamics of short-term spot prices. Other studies
investigate derivative products in EUA markets, the convenience yield, the term
structure of futures prices (Truck et al., 2006) as well as the eects of options trading
on market volatility (Chevallier et al., 2009). Studies by Bohringer and Lange (2005)
and Schleich et al. (2006) simulate the development of the CO2 price with respect
to changes in dierent market design parameters.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a thorough analysis of the dependence
structure between EUA returns and those of other nancial variables and commodi-
ties. As EUAs are a factor of production, it is plausible to assume that changes in the
emission allowance price are related to the dynamics of other commodity markets.
We contribute to the literature in three dimensions. First, we apply dierent copula
models to investigate the nature of dependence between EUA returns and those of
other nancial assets. Copulas are generally a very exible method to model the
relationship between dierent variables. Among the advantages are the possibility to
account for dierent types of tail dependence of the return series under consideration.
The application of copulas yields possibly better insights than the application of
linear correlation models only. To our best knowledge, this chapter is a pioneer study
on copulas in the area of carbon market research. Second, we apply time-varying
copulas to investigate whether the relationships under consideration are constant
over time. This procedure allows us to investigate whether inuencing factors on
the carbon price changed over time and whether the nancial crisis had an impact on
the dependence of the considered variables. Finally, we conduct a risk management
analysis to further illustrate the usefulness of the application of copulas. It is often
argued that the EUA price is more strongly inuenced by policy measures and
regulatory changes than other commodities (Chevallier, 2009). In consequence,
this market provides new challenges to market participants that need to adapt
their risk strategy. Therefore, we provide a risk analysis by comparing benchmark
models including a standard variance-covariance approach to the estimated copula
models. This allows to evaluate the models' ability to quantify market risk. We
show that a misspecication of the actual dependence structure might not only
lead to an inappropriate specication of the portfolio return distribution but also
underestimate the risks from joint extreme returns.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides
a brief description of the market mechanism for CO2 emission allowances as well
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as price drivers of the market. Section 1.3 provides a review of dierent copula
models with respect to estimation and model testing. Moreover, an overview of the
considered data is given. Section 1.4 presents the empirical results of our study and
the risk analysis. Section 1.5 concludes and gives suggestions for future work.
1.2 Carbon Pricing in Europe
1.2.1 Regulatory Setting
This section briey discusses the regulatory setting of the EU ETS. The scheme
aects combustion installations exceeding 20 MW including dierent kinds of in-
dustries such as metal, cement, paper, glass as well as power generation and rener-
ies. In total, the EU-ETS included some 10,000 installations in 2005, representing
approximately 40 per cent of EU's GHG emissions. After an initial pilot trading
period from 2005 to 2007, new National Allocation Plans (NAPs) have been issued
for the second trading phase from 2008 to 2012. From 2013 onwards, a third
trading period will run until 2020. In this third period, the individual NAPs will
be replaced by unied allocation rules applying to all member states. Therefore,
the annual quantity of allocated emission allowances has already been specied by
the EU-Directive until the year 2020. According to the European Commission, the
importance of auctioning will increase in Phase III reducing the number of allowances
that is allocated free of charge. Some regulatory settings are particularly important
as they shape compliance behaviour and thus are likely to have price eects. Under
the current system, banking { the storage of unused allowances { gives more leeway
for complying parties and smoothes the CO2 price. A recent and more detailed
discussion of banking and borrowing is provided by Chevallier (2012).
Generally, a lack of allowances requires a company to either buy a sucient
amount of EUAs or to invest in some plant-specic process improvements. A
third option is the purchase of additional allowances and emission credits from
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint Implementation (JI) projects, the
so-called Flexible Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. Failure to submit a
sucient amount of allowances at the end of the compliance year results in sanction
payments of 100e per EUA. In addition, companies have to surrender the missing
allowances. As a consequence, participating companies face several risks specic to
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emissions trading. In particular, price risk of uctuating allowance prices, volume
risk, and political risk have to be considered. Because of unexpected uctuations
in energy demand, the emitters do not know ex ante their exact demand for EUAs.
As the framework and goals of climate policies may change, market participants
face risks from the political arena, see also Chapter 2. Naturally, market generic
risks, for example counterparty, operational, and reputational risk, are also present
(Bokenkamp et al., 2005).
1.2.2 Literature Overview
To set up a comprehensive analysis, it is of great importance to identify the key
price determinants of the CO2 emission allowances. Following the investigation of
the SO2 permit price by Burtraw (1996), we categorise the principle driving factors
of the CO2 allowance price into (i) policy and regulatory issues, and (ii) market
fundamentals that directly concern the production of CO2 and thus the demand
of CO2 allowances. For our pricing model, we are interested in the determinants
of short-term price behaviour. Policy changes might lead to sudden price spikes
and phases of extreme volatility if the market was surprised by decisions concerning
the allowance allocation or the European commitment to reduce GHG emissions by
30% instead of 20% until 2020 (Sanin and Violante, 2009; Gronwald and Ketterer,
2012). Incorporating part (ii), the allowance price fundamentally depends on the
emission level of CO2 which is inuenced by factors such as economic growth and
fuel prices. Some comprehensive research on determinants has been conducted by
Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007), Alberola et al. (2008), and Chesney and Taschini
(2008). An important force is weather data such as temperature, rainfall, and wind
speed. Hintermann (2010) detects a negative eect of availability of hydropower in
Nordic countries during the rst trading phase. Rickels et al. (2010) conrm this
result for the second trading phase and nd the same relationship with respect to
wind power: higher wind speeds in Germany lead to a lower EUA price. Mansanet-
Bataller et al. (2007), Rickels et al. (2007), and Alberola et al. (2008) show that
extremely hot or cold days have a positive eect on the EUA price.
Energy variables have a clearly identied impact on the price of emission
allowances (Chevallier, 2009). For example, an electricity producer switching from
`cheap-but-dirty' coal to `expensive-but-cleaner' gas can signicantly reduce emis-
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sions per MWh of produced electricity. Therefore, fuel-switching from coal to gas
implies less emissions to be covered with permits, and the price of EUAs should be
dependent on prices of gas and coal. With respect to the inuence of energy prices on
the carbon price, the literature reports relatively robust patterns. Mansanet-Bataller
et al. (2007) nd positive eects of oil and gas prices on the EUA price in Phase I,
while there is no signicant inuence of the coal price. The same results are given
by Hintermann (2010). In a study by Rickels et al. (2007), coal shows up with a
negative sign. Similarly, Alberola et al. (2008) reports a negative eect of coal on
the carbon price and detect positive eects of gas and oil prices.
The dependence of carbon and energy prices is studied in bidirectional manner.
On the one hand, the driving factors for the carbon price are identied. On the other
hand, the reverse eect of carbon on energy and commodity prices is investigated.
Kara et al. (2008) report that the EU emissions trading has a price-increasing eect
on the electricity price in Finland. Fell (2008) nds a strong response of Nordic
electricity prices to EUA price shocks. Thoenes (2011) rearms this conclusion
for the German market. Fell (2008) and Thoenes (2011) both discover that the
relationship between fuel prices and the electricity price is dierent during peak
and o-peak load. Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008) show that carbon price
changes are passed through to the wholesale power price in Germany during Phase I
(2005-2007). This eect seems asymmetric as carbon price increases have a stronger
impact on the power price. Prete and Norman (2011) can conrm the pass-through
to the electricity price in in several European countries during Phase II (2008-2012),
but they cannot conrm the asymmetric price adjustments. Bunn and Fezzi (2009)
investigate the impact of the EU ETS on wholesale electricity and gas prices in
the UK. Using a structural co-integrated VAR model, they conclude that the prices
of carbon and gas jointly inuence the equilibrium price of electricity. Nazi and
Milunovich (2010) apply a restricted VAR model to test for existence of causal
relationship and long-run links between the price of carbon and prices of energy
fuels and electricity. Their results suggest that the dynamics of fuel prices are
rather independent from the price of emissions permits during Phase I. Bertrand
(2012), however, shows that the carbon price has a signicant impact on gas and
coal prices during Phase II. The latter study also conrms the eect of the EUA
price on the electricity price. Generally, the literature nds a pass-through of the
carbon to the electricity price, but the results for fuel prices seem varied.
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Less attention is payed to the relationship of the emission allowance price with
nancial variables. A rising carbon price, as a factor of production, could be related
to additional costs and uncertainties for producers and might have an adverse eect
on equity markets in general or equities of certain industries in particular. Kosobud
et al. (2005) nd no statistically signicant correlations between monthly returns of
the SO2 emission allowance price in the US market and returns from various nancial
investments. Hintermann (2010) spots no inuence of the British FTSE equity index
during the rst trading phase of the EU ETS. Oberndorfer (2009) examines the
impact of the EUA price development on stock market returns of energy companies
and identies a positive eect that varies across countries. Veith et al. (2009) employ
a multifactor model and conrm this nding for the rst trading phase: stock market
returns of energy companies are positively correlated with the emission allowance
price. Daskalakis et al. (2009) detect negative correlations of EUA futures with
equity market returns that might oer signicant diversication opportunities to
European equity investors. They argue that the factors determining stock and bond
prices are substantially dierent from those aecting emission permits. In a study
on the relationship between macroeconomic variables and carbon futures, Chevallier
(2009) nds that stock and bond markets { as proxies for macroeconomic risk { have
little inuence on EUA futures. The author suggests that emission allowances are
an too easily storable commodity and therefore not prone to react to macroeconomic
shocks as much as stock markets.
To our best knowledge, so far there has been no empirical study concentrating
mainly on the dependence structure between EUA returns and those of other -
nancial variables or commodity markets. Next to standard approaches investigating
linear dependence by correlation analysis, in our analysis we apply dierent copulas
to model the complex dependence structure between the return series of carbon
emission, commodity, and equity markets.
1.3 Data and Model
1.3.1 Copula Models
The application of copula models has lately become very popular in empirical
nance as copulas are a exible instrument for modelling the dependence structure
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of nancial time series. Copulas allow to assess various forms of dependence between
the variables under consideration. Hence, the application of copulas yields deeper
insights into the relationship of nancial assets than simple correlation measures.
Variables can be related in very specic ways (Hull, 2007). The copula concept is
particularly attractive as it allows to reect various forms of dependance, asymmetric
or non-linear, between the variables of interest. This can, for example, be helpful as
asset returns tend to be stronger correlated during volatile market phases and market
downturns (Longin and Solnik, 2001). Such specic behaviour can be captured by
copulas.
In empirical nance, traditional methods of describing the dependence struc-
ture between a set of variables have lately been criticised. Assuming that the
joint distribution of asset returns is normal and using the covariance matrix as a
measure of dependence, might be too simplistic. As shown in studies by Jondeau and
Rockinger (2006a), Junker et al. (2006), Luciano and Marena (2003), and McNeil
et al. (2005), the relationship between nancial assets might not be appropriately
described by simple correlations. This might lead to an inadequate assessment of
risks in joint extreme price movements. The copula methods oers a more exible
approach to measure the dependence structure of asset returns and a more robust
way to assess risks. With respect to analysing the dependence structure between
dierent nancial assets, copula models do not necessarily require assumptions
of joint normality for the distributions.1 Instead, a copula allows joining vari-
ous marginal distributions, sometimes also called unconditional distributions (Hull,
2007), into their one dimensional multivariate distribution. This is possible because
the multivariate joint distribution can be decomposed into marginal distributions
and an appropriate functional form for the dependence between the asset returns
under consideration. As its name suggests, the copula only provides information
how the underlying variables are linked or connected, but not about their marginal
distributions. Spitting these two components allows to combine a wide range of
marginals with dierent copula functions. A detailed description of the copula
method and its application in nance is given by Cherubini et al. (2004).
This section provides a brief review on the estimation as well as goodness-of-t
tests for copulas that will be used in the subsequent empirical analysis. Since this can
1Note that the Gaussian copula with the assumption of normal marginals coincides with the
multivariate normal distribution and is fully characterised by the correlation coecient.
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be considered as a pioneer study on applying and testing dierent copula models to
emission allowance markets, we also briey illustrate some basic concepts of copula
families and the dependence measure Kendall's  .
1.3.2 Copula Functions
A copula is a function that combines marginal distributions to form a joint mul-
tivariate distribution. Sklar (1959) initially introduced this concept which receives
growing attention and is applied to various issues in nancial economics and econo-
metrics (Cherubini et al., 2004; McNeil et al., 2005). Patton (2006) used copulas
to model exchange rate dependance and Jondeau and Rockinger (2006a) to uncover
the relationship of US and European stock market returns. Michelis and Ning
(2010) employed the copula method to investigate the dependence structure between
stock market returns and exchange rate returns in Canada. Copula functions
allow to model relationships without requiring assumptions regarding the joint
distributions of the underlying variables. Overall, the use of copulas allows to model
the dependence in a more general and exible setting compared to linear correlation
measures: non-linearity, asymmetry, and fat tails can be captured. The following
provides an introduction to copulas as in Truck and Rong (2010). The interested
reader may nd further information in Nelsen (1999), Cherubini et al. (2004), or
Hull (2007).
A copula is the distribution function of a random vector in Rn with standard
uniform marginals. The copula approach allows to dierentiate between uncondi-
tional distributions of respective variables and their dependance structure (McNeil
et al., 2005). Given a random vector of random variables X = (X1; : : : ; Xn)
0, its
dependence structure is completely described by the joint distribution function
F (x1; : : : ; xn). Each random variable Xi has a marginal distributions Fi that is
assumed to be continuous for simplicity. Each continuous random variable X can
be transformed, using its own distribution function F . Then, the random variables
F (X) are uniformly distributed over [0; 1] . Hence, the copula can be extracted from
the joint distribution function:
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F (x1; : : : ; xn) = P (X1 < x1; : : : ; Xn < xn)
= P [F1(X1) < F1(x1); : : : ; Fn(Xn) < Fn(xn)]
= C(F1(x1); : : : ; Fn(xn)); :(1.1)
The function C is the so-called copula of the random vector X and represents a joint
distribution function with standard uniform marginals.2 The copula combines the
marginal distribution of Fi to recover the joint distribution. In particular, any choice
of marginal and joint distributions can be connected using the copula method.
1.3.3 Examples of Copulas
There are many dierent types of copulas from which we chose the most commonly
applied functions: the Gaussian, Student-t, Clayton, and Gumbel copula. Given
their parametric form, the multivariate Gaussian and Student-t copula belong to
the class of elliptical copulas. Probably the most commonly used copula is the
Gaussian copula which is constructed from the multivariate normal distribution and
is denoted by:
CG (u1; : : : ; ud) = 
d
(
 1(u1); : : : ; 1(ud)):(1.2)
Hereby,  represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function,  1
the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function and d the
standard multivariate normal distribution with correlation matrix . Applying
CG to two univariate standard normally distributed random variables, results in
a standard bivariate normal distribution with correlation coecient . As the
multivariate normal copula correlates random variables rather near the mean, it
fails to incorporate dependence in the tail. The Student-t copula, by contrast, is
able to capture tail dependence to some extent and is written as:
T;v(u1; u2; : : : ; ud) = t;v(t
 1
v (u1); t
 1
v (u1); : : : ; t
 1
v (ud));(1.3)
2If the marginal distributions Fi are continuous, the copula function C(F1(x1); : : : ; Fn(xn)) is
unique (Sklar, 1959).
10 CHAPTER1: CARBON, COMMODITY, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
where t;v is the multivariate Student-t distribution with v degrees of freedom and
correlation matrix . Depending on the degrees of freedom parameter, the Student-
t copula determines the strength of the tail dependence. Generally, strong tail
dependence is illustrated by low values of the parameter v.
Both elliptical copulas can be used to model symmetric tail dependence. In
economic and nancial applications it might, however, be useful to dierentiate the
behaviour in the upper and the lower tail. Financial assets often only exhibit tail-
dependence in one of the tails, for example when they are stronger correlated during
market downturns. Two variables that are characterised by strong tail-dependence
in the lower left tail exhibit simultaneous extreme negative returns, whereas high
positive returns in one of the variables may be rather independent of the other
variable. To model such asymmetric tail dependence, so-called Archimedean copulas
can be used (Cherubini et al., 2004). Amongst the Archimedean copulas, the most
intensely used functions are the Clayton and the Gumbel copula. On the one hand,
the Clayton copula captures greater co-movements in the lower left tail. On the
other hand, the Gumbel copula exhibits stronger dependence in the upper right tail.
The multivariate Clayton copula is denoted by:
CCl (u1; :::; ud) =
"
dX
i=1
u i   d+ 1
#1=
;(1.4)
For the Clayton copula, the parameter  > 0 measures the degree of depen-
dence between the considered variables. A high  indicates strong dependence,
particularly in the negative lower tail. When  is close to zero, the dependence
between the marginals vanishes (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). As mentioned above,
the Gumbel copula depicts co-movements in the positive upper tail and is denoted
by:
CGu (u1; :::; ud) = exp
24 ( dX
i=1
( ln(ui)
)1=35 ;(1.5)
where  > 1 indicates the dependence between the random variables X1; :::Xd.
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Often Kendall's  is used for characterising the dependence structure. Kendall's
 is a rank-based measure of dependence based on the concept of concordance. When
large values of one random variable occur together with large values of another
variable, one speaks of concordance (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). In the case of
discordance, by contrast, large values are linked to low values. Kendall's  measures
the probability of concordance and discordance (McNeil et al., 2005). Values of 
range from  1 to +1, while in the case of independence  will be 0 (Nelsen, 1999).
Kendall's  is a simple concept but allows estimating the true underlying copula as it
is shown for example by Deheuvels (1979).3 In the case of a bivariate one-parameter
copula, Kendall's  is an appropriate dependence measure, as there is a one-to-one
relationship between the copula parameter and Kendall's  .
Figure 1.1: Scatter plot of simulated dependence
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Note: Scatter plots of the simulated dependence structure of ranks for dierent copulas with the
same Kendal's  = 0:5. This gure illustrates the dependence between ranks for the Gaussian
(upper left panel), Student-t (upper right panel), Clayton (lower left panel), and Gumbel copula
(lower right panel).
For the purpose of illustrating the dierent copula models, Figure 1.1 shows
scatter plots for four dierent copula functions based on the same Kendall's  = 0:5.
3Another rank-based measure of dependence is Spearman's . Cherubini et al. (2004) explain
these measures as well as their dierences in greater detail.
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The upper panels illustrate the symmetric dependence structure for the Gaussian
and the Student-t copula. The Student-t copula exhibits more tail dependence than
the Gaussian copula but only captures symmetric tail dependence. However, the
asymmetric Clayton copula detect greater dependence in the lower left tail, while
stronger co-movements in the upper right tail are captured by the Gumbel copula.
1.3.4 Estimation Procedure
As asserted above, copulas oer an alternative to the correlation coecient as it
comes to modelling the dependence structure. Dierent approaches to estimate
copulas have been suggested in the literature (Cherubini et al., 2004; Scholzel and
Friederichs, 2008; Michelis and Ning, 2010). In this article, the copula parameters
are estimated using the transforms from the empirical marginal distribution function
F^i(xi) by canonical maximum likelihood (CML) estimation (Bouye et al., 2000).
4
The vector of parameters is estimated semi-parametrically by maximising the log
likelihood for the copula density using the empirical marginals F^i(xi).
Because of the conditional heteroscedasticity usually present in nancial time
series, instead of modelling the unconditional return distribution, we concentrate on
the conditional returns. We employ the framework of semi-parametric copula-based
multivariate dynamic (SCOMDY) models suggested by Chen and Fan (2006). As
the name indicates, this class of models arises from a combination of methods.
The conditional mean and the conditional variance of a multivariate time series
are specied parametrically, while the joint distribution takes a semi-parametric
form using a parametric copula and non-parametric marginals. The method creates
additional exibility. The typical non-normal movements of nancial time series can
be captured more accurately. Still, the copula estimation remains low-dimensional
and allows to represent various non-linear and asymmetric dependence structures
(Linton and Yan, 2011). Following the notation by Chen and Fan (2006), Yt is
4In the bivariate case, based on the estimated value of  , the dependence parameter for the
chosen copula can be calculated as a function of  . Genest et al. (2009) explain this procedure for
the Gaussian, Student-t, Clayton and Gumbel copula. Under weak regularity conditions on the
copula family, this yields a consistent estimator of the dependence parameter. For the Student-t
copula, as indicated by Equation 1.3, the econometrician has to also estimate the parameter for
the degrees of freedom. In comparison to other estimation techniques, the copula estimation via
rank transformation and Kendall's  is particularly simple and therefore often used in practical
applications. Unfortunately, it is limited to a bivariate setting because it makes inference on the
dependence structure of the multivariate model from a chosen dependence coecient.
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a d-dimensional process of endogenous and Xt is a vector of exogenous variables,
t = 1; :::n denotes a vector stochastic process. A SCOMDY model is then dened
as follows:
(1.6) Yt = t(1) +
p
Ht()t;
where the vector t(1) denotes the true conditional mean parameter and the vec-
tor Ht() the true conditional variance, both for given values of Yt 1; Yt 2; ::: and
Xt; Xt 1; :::. The innovations in vector t are i.i.d. with zero mean and unit variance.
They have the distribution function F () = C(F1(1)); :::; Fd(d)) with Fj() as true
but unknown continuous marginal and C(u1; :::; ud) as true copula function.
Various non-linear models can be used for modelling the conditional mean and
the conditional variance. In combination with the variety of available copula models,
this approach allows a great extent of exibility for the nal model specication.
The reader may nd a more thorough description of the SCOMDY model class
in the original paper by Chen and Fan (2006). The estimation procedure can be
summarised the following way:
1. Estimate all conditional mean and variance parameters to obtain standardised
innovations.
2. The empirical distribution function of these standardised innovations, denoted
as F^j(j;t()), j=1,...,d, is estimated non-parametrically. Section 1.4 describes
this step for our dataset.
3. The copula dependence parameter is derived by using the copula specication
as in Equations 1.2 to 1.5 and its density C(F^1(1;t()),..., F^d(d;t()) for
maximisation of the log likelihood.
1.3.5 Goodness-of-Fit Tests
As described in Section 1.3.3, each copula captures a dierent dependence struc-
ture (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005). The econometrician needs to decide which of
the estimated copulas reects the actual dependence structure of the data most
appropriately. According to Berg and Bakken (2007), this decision should not be
based on the information criteria such as Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC).
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Instead, it is recommended to use goodness-of-t (GOF) approaches to reject or
accept a specic copula (Panchenko, 2005; Genest et al., 2006, 2009). Several GOF
test have been suggested by the literature, see e.g. Berg and Bakken (2007) or
Genest et al. (2009). In our empirical analysis, we use goodness-of-t tests that
investigate the distance between the estimated and the so-called empirical copula to
select the most appropriate among a set of copulas (Genest et al., 2006, 2009). The
nonparametric empirical copula is calculated from the empirical margins whereby
its functional form is tted to the data. The distance between the estimated and
the empirical copula is then evaluated using the so-called Cramer-Von Mises test
statistic. The parametric copula that is closest to the empirical copula represents
the most appropriate choice (Trivedi and Zimmer, 2005).
The following section describes the procedure in greater detail. Empirical cop-
ulas were introduced by Deheuvels (1979). The empirical copula can be understood
as the sample version of the dependance structure (Cherubini et al., 2004). The
empirical marginal distribution converges towards the actual distribution function
for n approaching innity. Let (X1i; :::; Xni) be n observations of the random variable
Xi. Then, the empirical marginal cdf for a random variable Xi is:
F^i(xi) =
1
n+ 1
nX
j=1
I(Xji  xi) i = 1; ::; d;(1.7)
where I() returns the value of 1 if Xji  xi and 0 otherwise. The term n+1 in the
denominator is used to keep the empirical cdf below 1. Given the marginal cdf's,
the empirical probability integral can be transformed uji = F^i(xji) for i = 1; ::; d and
j = 1; ::; n for the vector u = (u1; ::; ud), and the empirical copula can be derived by:
Cemp(u) =
1
n+ 1
nX
j=1
I(F^1(xj1)  u1); ::::; F^d(xjd)  ud))(1.8)
=
1
n+ 1
nX
j=1
I(U1  u1; ::::; Ud  ud):(1.9)
According to Tsukahara (2005), the empirical copula is a consistent estimator
of the true copula and therefore is a well-accepted benchmark for copula goodness-
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of-t tests.5 We concentrate on so-called `blanket tests' which do not depend on
prior categorisation of the underlying data or any arbitrary choice of smoothing
parameters, weight functions, or kernels. Genest et al. (2009) specify dierent
versions of such tests and conduct a large Monte Carlo experiment to compare these
options. They report particularly good results for the blanket tests using ranks or
the Rosenblatt transform. To evaluate the distance between the estimated and the
empirical copula, the authors nd the best results for the so-called Cramer-Von Mises
statistic. Hence, we only describe tests based on ranks that use the Cramer-Von
Mises statistic for measuring the dierence between the estimated and the empirical
copula.
We investigate whether a specic parametric copula represents the dependence
structure of a multivariate distribution appropriately. The test procedure can be
roughly summarised as follows:
1. Based on the empirical cdfs for the marginal series, estimate the empirical
copula Cemp(Ui) and the parametric copula C(Ui).
2. Using the Cramer-Von Mises statistic, calculate the distance between the
empirical and the estimated copula:
Sn =
nX
i=1
[Cemp(Ui)  C(Ui)]2
3. In a bootstrap procedure, for some large integer D, the following steps are
repeated:
(a) Generate a random sample from C and compute the associated rank
vectors (U1 ; :::; U

n) as well as the empirical copula C
emp(u).
(b) Estimate the parametric copula C .
(c) Determine Sn =
Pn
i=1[C
emp(Ui)  C(Ui)]2 for the generated sample.
4. From the D bootstrap samples, an approximate p-value, measuring the goodness-
of-t of the copula, can be calculated as the fraction of simulations where
Sn > Sn.
5Note that the empirical copula is not a copula according to the denition by Deheuvels (1979),
but rather the observed frequency of P (U1  u1; ::::; Ud  ud).
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Under the null hypothesis, a specic copula provides a good t for the depen-
dence structure of a multivariate distribution. High p-values, which do not reject the
null, indicate that the considered copula mirrors the actual dependence structure
of the data well. For a copula that does not represent an appropriate choice, given
the actual data, the p-value should be low. In this case, depending on the level
of condence, the null hypothesis will be rejected. Note that for the case where
several copula families cannot be rejected by the goodness-of-t tests, an alternative
approach as specied in e.g. Chen and Fan (2006) or Diks et al. (2010), needs to be
implemented. These tests are particularly designed to compare competing copula
models based on their in-sample (Chen and Fan, 2006) or out-of-sample (Diks et al.,
2010) log likelihood scores.
1.3.6 Data
In this section, we investigate the dependence structure between daily returns from
traded emission allowance contracts and various other nancial variables during
the time period 2. January 2008 to 31. December 2009. The existing literature
discusses the factors which are most important for the carbon price. Based on this
research, we examine a number of variables from commodity and nancial markets.
As illustrated in Section 1.2.2, the literature identies energy prices to exert a strong
inuence on the carbon price due to fuel-switching in the power sector. Therefore,
from commodity markets, we choose gas and coal futures returns as well as 2010
oil futures returns. The gas and oil futures are obtained from the International
Commodity Exchange (ICE). Data on coal futures as well as electricity futures are
taken from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig. The underlying for the
electricity futures is the Phelix Day Base. Data on the EUA price are obtained from
the London-based European Climate Exchange (ECX). As emission levels are related
to economic activity, we take stock markets as a proxy for economic development. In
addition to the broader European stock market index, the Eurostoxx 50, we consider
the more energy-specic DJ Europe Energy Stock Index (E1ENE) and the European
Renewable Energy Index (ERIXP). One may assume that the relationship between
the carbon price and energy-related stocks is particularly strong. For our analysis,
we consider log-returns that are calculated as rt = ln(Pt=Pt 1) from the original
price series.
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1.4 Estimation Results
1.4.1 Dependence Structures
Following the SCOMDY approach described in Section 1.3.4, in a rst step we need
to nd an appropriate model for the marginals. We need to estimate the parameters
for the conditional mean j;t(1) and conditional variance hj;t() equations.
6 We
focus on dierent ARMA-GARCH specications for each of the considered series
and abstain from using additional exogenous variables. To avoid over-tting, the
best model is chosen based on Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC). Table 1.1 summarises the results for the considered
series and reports the model choice according to the considered model parsimony
criteria. The obtained standardised residuals will then be used in the subsequent
empirical analysis. To test for i.i.d property of the standardised residuals, the BDS
test for independence was applied to the standardised residuals. The BDS test is a
portmanteau test for time-based dependence in a series and can be used to examine
whether the residuals are independent and identically distributed. We found that
for none of the considered series the null hypothesis of i.i.d could be rejected. In
the following, we therefore assume that all standardised residuals exhibit the desired
i.i.d. property necessary for the copula estimation. For ease of readability, we will
henceforth adhere to the expression returns instead of using standardised residuals.
Table 1.1: Choice of the best ARMA-GARCH model
Time series Suggested model
EUA futures ARMA(1,0)-GARCH(1,1)
Coal futures ARMA(1,0)-GARCH(2,3)
Oil 2010 futures ARMA(0,0)-GARCH(1,1)
Gas futures ARMA(0,1)-GARCH(1,2)
EEX futures ARMA(1,0)-GARCH(1,3)
Eurostoxx 50 Spot ARMA(1,0)-GARCH(1,2)
E1ENE Spot ARMA(1,0)-GARCH(1,2)
ERIXP Spot ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1)
Note: The choice of the best ARMA-GARCH model for each of the considered time series is based
on AIC and BIC model selection criteria.
In a next step, we investigate the dependence structure between returns of
EUAs and the other considered commodities and nancial variables based on the
6The estimation was conducted in Matlab.
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Figure 1.2: Illustrating daily EUA 2010 and coal futures
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Note: Standardised residuals for daily EUA 2010 futures versus coal futures (upper left panel),
ranks for daily EUA 2010 Futures standardised residuals versus ranks for coal futures standardised
residuals (upper right panel), 3d histogram of rank transforms for daily EUA 2010 futures versus
coal futures (lower left panel), and t of the Student-t copula to the rank transforms (lower right
panel).
tted models for the marginal return series. As pointed out in Section 1.3.4, after
estimating the parameters for the marginal series, the next step is to estimate the
empirical distribution functions F^j(j;t()). This has the advantage that the possibly
unknown distribution for the returns is not required, since the empirical marginal cdf
can be used. The CML method is then applied to the transforms from the empirical
distribution function to estimate the dependence parameters ^ for the Clayton, ^
for the Gumbel, the copula correlation parameters ^G for the Gaussian, and ^t for
the Student-t copula. Note that the degrees of freedom parameter v needs to be
estimated for the Student-t copula, so that the results for the copula correlation
parameters ^G and ^t are not necessarily identical.
Figure 1.2 provides a plot of the standardised residuals for daily EUA 2010
futures versus coal futures, the rank transforms of the standardised residuals for
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Figure 1.3: Illustrating daily EUA 2010 futures and E1ENE
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Note: Standardised residuals for daily EUA 2010 futures versus E1ENE returns (upper left panel),
ranks for daily EUA 2010 futures standardised residuals versus ranks of E1ENE standardised
residuals (upper right panel), 3d histogram of ranks transforms for daily EUA 2010 futures versus
E1ENE (lower left panel), and t of the Student-t copula to the rank transforms (lower right
panel).
EUA 2010 futures versus coal futures, a 3d histogram of the rank transforms, and
the t of the Student-t copula to the transforms. The analogous graphs are also
provided for the series daily EUA 2010 futures versus E1ENE returns in Figure 1.3.
We also estimate Kendall's ^ for each of the bivariate series and conduct a
signicance test for the dependence between returns with H0 :  = 0 versus H0 :
 6= 0. The test is non-parametric, as it does not rely on any assumptions on the
distributions of two variables X and Y . Then under a null hypothesis of X and
Y being independent, the sampling distribution of  will have an expected value of
zero. Note that the precise distribution cannot be characterised in terms of common
distributions, however, it can be calculated exactly for small samples.7
7For larger samples, commonly an approximation to the normal distribution, with zero mean
and variance 2(2n + 5)=9n(n   1) is used. For further details on the test we refer to Prokhorov
(2001).
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We nd signicant dependence at the 1% level between EUA returns and other
return series. Only for the oil futures, the estimated coecient for Kendall's ^ is not
signicant at the 1% or 5% level. The results are displayed in Table 1.2. We nd that
Kendall's ^ ranges from approximately -0.05 to 0.41 for the dierent series, while the
Gaussian and the Student-t copula correlation parameters range from approximately
-0.07 to 0.60. The highest dependence can be observed between returns of 2010 EUA
and electricity futures contracts, while we observe the lowest rank dependence and
correlation between 2010 EUA and oil futures contracts. Interestingly, here the
estimated coecients for Kendall's ^ , ^G, and ^t are slightly negative. However, in
2008 and 2009 the oil futures behaved quite particular, dropping from a peak at 140
US Dollars to a price remaining at around 80 US Dollars. This might explain the
weak correlation and the negative sign. There is not only a signicant dependence
between commodity and EUA futures contracts, but also between EUA futures and
equity markets. In fact the returns of stock market indices { the Eurostoxx 50,
the energy specic index E1ENE, and the renewable energy index ERIXP { seem
to exhibit even a higher degree of dependence with EUA futures returns than for
example oil and gas futures. Generally, our results contradict some of the earlier
studies by Kosobud et al. (2005) and Daskalakis et al. (2009) on the dependence
between emission allowances and other nancial assets. While the former found no
statistically signicant correlations between returns of SO2 emission allowances and
returns from other nancial variables, the latter observed that EUA futures returns
were negatively correlated with equity market returns during the pilot trading
period.
To investigate which of the copulas describes the dependence structure best, we
use the Cramer-Von Mises statistic to measure the distance between the empirical
and the estimated copula. Because the distance between the estimated and the
empirical copula alone is not sucient to determine whether any of the models
really provides a good t to the data, goodness-of-t tests proposed by Genest
et al. (2009) are conducted. Recall that for these tests, the null hypothesis is that
the examined copula provides an appropriate t to the data. Following the test
procedure described in the previous section, for each of the copula families, we create
D = 1000 bootstrap samples and determine the distance between the empirical and
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Table 1.2: Kendall's ^ and estimated copula dependence parameters
Asset ^ ^ ^ ^G ^t
Coal futures 0.2458** 0.5250 1.2666 0.3680 0.3744 (v^ = 27:90)
Oil 2010 futures -0.0544 0.0000 1.0000 -0.0696 -0.0711 (v^ > 1000)
Gas futures 0.1140** 0.2114 1.1175 0.1804 0.1857 (v^ = 14:96)
EEX futures 0.4135** 0.9840 1.6010 0.5920 0.6008 (v^ = 14:19)
Eurostoxx 50 Spot 0.1818** 0.3473 1.2055 0.2954 0.2984 (v^ = 21:47)
E1ENE Spot 0.2651** 0.5732 1.3067 0.3937 0.4044 (v^ = 8:82)
ERIXP Spot 0.2005** 0.4761 1.2115 0.3169 0.3203 (v^ = 12:31)
Note: Kendall's ^ and the estimated copula dependence parameters ^ for the Clayton, ^ for the
Gumbel, ^G for the Gaussian, and ^t, v^ for the Student-t copula for standardised residuals of EUA
futures and the considered assets. For Kendall's  we also report the results of a signicance test
with H0 :  = 0. The asterisk denote signicant rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% ** and
5% * level.
the estimated copula for each sample.8 The samples are then used to calculate
p-values with respect to the null hypothesis. The p-value provides the level of
signicance at which the null hypothesis would be rejected. The p-value therefore
measures how much evidence we have against the null hypothesis of an appropriate
t of the suggested copula. Results for the Cramer-Von Mises statistic as well as
p-values for the considered copula families are presented in Table 1.3.
The results indicate that for the majority of the considered bivariate series
the Student-t copula yields the smallest distance between the estimated and the
empirical copula. The distance is the smallest for ve of the considered bivari-
ate series, while it yields the second smallest distance for the other two pairs.
Interestingly, the Gaussian copula also provides distances that are only slightly
higher than those of the Student-t copula and signicantly smaller than those of the
Clayton and the Gumbel copula. Only for the relationship between EUA futures
and Eurostoxx 50 spot returns, the Gumbel copula yields the smallest distance. For
the relationship between EUA futures and ERIXP spot returns, the Clayton copula
yields the smallest distance.
Our results are also conrmed by the conducted bootstrap goodness-of-t tests.
We nd that the Student-t and the Gaussian copula perform best for most of the
considered series. An appropriate t of the Gaussian and the Student-t copula to the
dependence structure cannot be rejected for any of the series at the 5% signicance
8This is the number of bootstrap samples that is also applied in Genest et al. (2009) providing
good results for the considered goodness-of-t tests.
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level. At this signicance level, the hypothesis of an appropriate t of the Clayton
and the Gumbel copula is rejected for ve out of seven series. An appropriate t of
the Clayton or the Gumbel copula cannot be rejected at the 5% level between EUA
and gas futures (Clayton and Gumbel), EUA futures and the ERIXP spot (Clayton)
as well as EUA futures and the Eurostoxx 50 (Gumbel). For the Gumbel copula an
appropriate t is even rejected at the 1% level for most of the series.
Table 1.3: Distance between estimated and empirical copula
Asset Clayton Gumbel Gaussian Student-t
Coal futures 0.0326 (0.036) 0.0557 (<0.001) 0.0167 (0.536) 0.0162 (0.601)
Oil 2010 futures 0.0702 (0.014) 0.0702 (<0.001) 0.0328 (0.064) 0.0324 (0.062)
Gas futures 0.0177 (0.471) 0.0211 (0.158) 0.0164 (0.585) 0.0151 (0.654)
EEX futures 0.1537 (<0.001) 0.0521 (<0.001) 0.0085 (0.980) 0.0083 (0.938)
Eurostoxx 50 0.0519 (0.002) 0.0162 (0.478) 0.0235 (0.242) 0.0235 (0.205)
E1ENE 0.0557 (0.003) 0.0471 (<0.001) 0.0155 (0.635) 0.0130 (0.797)
ERIXP 0.0193 (0.333) 0.0478 (<0.001) 0.0239 (0.209) 0.0220 (0.264)
Note: Either the Student-t or the Clayton copula yield the lowest distance according to the Cramer-
Von Mises statistic. The p-values, shown in parentheses, are based on bootstrap goodness-of-t
test (Genest et al., 2009). Bold letters indicate the lowest distance for the considered series.
Overall, we nd that the elliptical Gaussian and Student-t copula provide an
appropriate t to all considered bivariate return series. Given the rather symmetric
dependence structure for most of the considered variables, the ndings of Zach-
mann and von Hirschhausen (2008) regarding an asymmetric relationship cannot
be conrmed by our study. This is in line with Prete and Norman (2011) who
report a symmetric structure for emission allowance futures and electricity futures
during Phase II. Note that the conducted goodness-of-t tests are not able to provide
information on which copula provides the best t to the data. The tests do neither
reject the Gaussian nor the Student-t at the 1% or 5% level for any of the series. For
most of the considered return series, they provide p-values of a magnitude greater
then 0:2. To decide which model is closer to the true model among a set of valid
models, alternative tests would be required, as described in Chen and Fan (2006)
and Diks et al. (2010). We leave this investigation to future work.
1.4.2 Time-Varying Copulas
To investigate the nature of the dependence through time, we further apply a time-
varying estimation of the copula parameters for the bivariate series. We hereby
decide to estimate the dierent copula parameters using a rolling window approach
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as it is applied in Giacomini et al. (2009) or Gregoire et al. (2008). Again, we consider
a conditional approach such that, in a rst step, we estimate ARMA-GARCHmodels
for each return series and calculate the standardised residuals. In a second step,
the empirical distribution function is applied to the standardised residuals, and the
copula models are estimated based on the derived ranks. We choose a window length
of 126 trading days that corresponds to approximately six months. The rst period
considers returns from 3. January 2008 to 30. June 2008, while the last window
uses data from 6. July 2009 to 31. December 2009.9 Figure 1.4 shows a plot of
the estimated copula parameters for the Clayton, Gumbel and Student-t copula.
Depicted is the relationship between EUA futures returns and coal, electricity, and
gas futures returns as well as the relationship between the Eurostoxx 50, E1ENE, and
ERIXP spot returns respectively. Note that for all series the estimated dependence
parameter for the Gaussian copula was almost identical to the Student-t copula
parameter. Therefore, these parameters are not provided in the graphs.
For most of the considered series, we nd that the estimated copula parameters
exhibit time-variation. We generally nd that the dependence between EUA futures
and the considered commodity futures is increasing during the period of the nancial
crisis in the second half of 2008. The dependence between the return series seems to
decrease to a lower level during 2009, in particular in its second half. This conrms
general results on time-varying correlation or dependence suggesting that returns
from nancial markets exhibit higher dependence during periods of economic or
market downturn.
The degree of time-variation, however, is considerably dierent for some of the
relationships under investigation. The dependence structure between EUA and coal
futures exhibits a particularly strong change: the copula parameters start to increase
for samples beginning in the second half of 2008. For example, the parameter of
the Clayton copula rises from approximately 0.4 to a value higher than 1. This
indicates that joint downward movements of the two series occur considerably more
often during this period of time. The parameters of the Student-t and the Gumbel
copula exhibit a similar behaviour, but in a more retained manner. The relationship
between EUA and electricity futures is generally found to be stronger for the entire
9More advanced approaches on the estimation of time-varying copulas, also with respect to
the optimal choice of window length, have been suggested by Patton (2006), Rodriguez (2007),
and Giacomini et al. (2009). However, our aim in this section is to provide a simple and rather
descriptive analysis of the dependence structure through time.
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Figure 1.4: Estimated copula parameters over time
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Note: Estimated copula parameters for the Clayton (blue), Gumbel (green), and Student-t (red)
copula for a six month rolling window period. The rst window covers observations from January
to June 2008, while the last period covers observations from July to December 2009. The graphs
show the results for dependence structure between returns for daily EUA 2010 futures and coal
futures (upper left panel), electricity futures (upper right panel), gas futures (middle left panel),
Eurostoxx 50 spot contracts (middle right panel), E1ENE DJ Europe Energy Stock Index spot
contracts (lower left panel) and ERIXP European Renewable Energy Index spot contracts (lower
right panel).
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time horizon. The relationship of EUA and gas futures seems to change only by the
end of 2008.
Analysing the relationship between EUA futures returns and the considered
equity indices yields further interesting insights. The dynamics of the dependence
structure between EUA futures and E1ENE spot returns are quite similar to those
of commodity markets through time. We nd, however, dierent results for the
relationship between EUA futures and Eurostoxx 50 spot returns as well as ERIXP
spot returns: here the dependence is very low during the rst six months of 2008.
The estimated parameters for the Clayton and the Student-t copula are close to zero,
while the parameter for the Gumbel copula is approximately one, indicating that
the dependence is very weak during this period. Three months later the dependence
becomes stronger, and the estimated parameters for all of the considered copulas
start to increase. For the Eurostoxx 50, this increase continues until August 2009,
while the parameters for the ERIXP rise signicantly until February 2009. All
copula parameters rise in absolute terms, in relative terms the increase is much
higher for the Student-t and the Clayton copula. This suggests that joint downward
movements are more pronounced during the nancial crisis. Towards the end of
the investigated period, we nd a slightly decreasing dependence structure between
EUAs and all of the considered equity indices. Note that conclusions as to whether
there is a structural break or a signicant change in the dependence structure during
the considered period require further statistical tests as suggested by Patton (2006)
or Giacomini et al. (2009).
1.4.3 Risk Management Analysis
As mentioned in Section 1.2.2, the EUA price is more likely to be inuenced by
policy measures and regulatory changes than conventional commodities. This spe-
cic feature brings about new challenges how to integrate EUAs in a portfolio.
Therefore, we extend the present analysis by a risk management perspective and
consider dierent exemplary portfolios with investments in several of the considered
assets. We test the Gaussian and Student-t copula models against two benchmark
approaches: a standard (static) multivariate variance-covariance approach and a
univariate AR-GARCH type model that is applied directly to the created return
series of the constructed portfolios. The forecasting performance of the models is
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investigated by conducting an out-of-sample analysis comparing one-day-ahead VaR
and distributional forecasts for the portfolios. We report the results for portfolios
with equal weights for each of the assets. We would like to point out that robustness
checks with varied portfolio weights and assets did not change the quality of the
results. In the following, results for four dierent portfolios will be reported:
• Portfolio 1 (PF1) with equal 25% weight for the following futures contracts:
EUA, coal, oil and gas.
• Portfolio 2 (PF2) with equal 25% weiht for the following futures contracts:
EUA, coal, gas and electricity.
• Portfolio 3 (PF3) with equal 25% weight for the following assets:
EUA, electricity, Eurostoxx 50 and ERIXP.
• Portfolio 4 (PF4) with equal 25% weight for the following assets:
EUA, Eurostoxx 50, E1ENE and ERIXP.
Value-at-Risk Analysis
For each portfolio (PF1-PF4) we create the return series based on the assumed equal
weights w = 0:25 for each asset. Then, in an out-of-sample forecasting study, the
performance of the copula models is tested against a standard multivariate normal
(MVN) approach and a univariate AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model for the portfolio
return series. Note that the multivariate normal approach does not consider the
conditional variance of the individual assets, so we expect the forecasts to vary
signicantly less through time for this model. Therefore, we assume that the
multivariate normal approach cannot react to signicant volatility changes in any
of the assets and might underestimate the risk, in particular during times of high
volatility.
With respect to copula models, we decide to examine the forecasting perfor-
mance using the Gaussian and the Student-t for the multivariate dependence struc-
ture between returns of the individual assets. Note that while these copulas provide
an appropriate t to the dependence structure in the bivariate case, we cannot
generally extrapolate these results to a multivariate setting. Before conducting our
risk analysis, the t of both copulas to the dependence structure between individual
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assets of the four portfolios was tested using the goodness-of-t tests described in
Section 1.3.5 and 1.4. The results indicated that an appropriate t of both, the
Gaussian and the Student-t, to the multivariate data could not be rejected.
Similar to Section 1.4.2, our risk analysis is conducted using a rolling window
of t = 126 days length, corresponding roughly to six months of observations. For the
univariate model, we derive the distributional forecast for the returns based on the
tted AR-GARCH model and the most recent forecast for the conditional volatility.
For the benchmark variance-covariance approach, we assume that the return series
and the dependence structure can be described by a multivariate normal distribution.
Under this assumption, we simply need to estimate the variance-covariance matrix 
for the return series. Using portfolio theory, the mean of the marginal return series,
the given portfolio weights, and the estimated variance-covariance matrix allow us to
calculate a distributional forecast of portfolio returns for the next day. For the copula
approach, we apply the discussed SCOMDY model with an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1)
process for the marginal series.10 Therefore, for each time step, we initially t an
AR-GARCH model to the individual return series and calculate the standardised
residuals. Then, using the transforms from the empirical distribution function for
the standardised residuals, the Gaussian and the Student-t copula are tted to the
multivariate series. We estimate the multivariate Gaussian and Student-t copula for
each time step, and therefore obtain the correlation matrix C^Gaussian and C^Student as
well as the degrees of freedom parameter v^ for the Student-t copula. Then, we use
the estimated copulas to simulate 10000 vectors of dependent uniformly distributed
random variables (u1; u2; u3; u4) from both copulas. Thereafter, the inverse of the
empirical distribution function and the conditional forecast for the volatility for the
marginal series are used to calculate the simulated conditional asset returns for the
series. Finally, using the portfolio weights we can then determine a simulated return
distribution for the portfolio in t+ 1.
An exemplary plot of the simulated return distribution for two of the methods
and Portfolio 4 is provided in Figure 1.5. Here, the distributional forecast for one
of the time steps using the Student-t copula model in comparison to a standard
10Because the analysis was conducted in a rolling window setting, dierent AR-GARCH type
models will provide the best t to the data at dierent points in time. Because choosing the
optimal model for each series at any time step based on a parsimonious model selection criteria
would be tedious, we decided to stick to a simple AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) that generally provided a
good t to all of the series.
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Figure 1.5: Exemplary plot of return distribution forecast
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Note: Exemplary plot of the return distribution forecast (left panel) and the tail of the return
distribution forecast (right panel) for the multivariate normal and the Student-t copula approach
with v = 8:03 for Portfolio 4. For both plots the blue line is the probability density for the
multivariate normal approach, while the red line provides the simulated density for a model using
the Student-t copula to model the dependence structure between rank transforms.
variance-covariance approach is plotted. Our results indicate that the standard
variance-covariance approach provides a lower estimate for the risk in particular in
the extreme tail of the distribution. Generally, for the model using the Student-t
copula, the simulated portfolio return distributions often exhibit some skewness and
excess kurtosis.
The rst six months were chosen as calibration period such that forecasts
for the time period 1. July 2008 to 31. December 2009 are compared. As men-
tioned above, the forecasts are determined using a rolling window technique with
re-estimation of the marginal distributions and dependence parameters after each
time step. The length of the in-sample period is xed with 126 trading days, while
the start date and end date successively increase by one observation. Figure 1.6
provides a plot of the actual portfolio returns as well as the estimated 99%-VaR
forecasts for Portfolio 4 using the univariate AR-GARCH model, a standard MVN
approach as well as the conditional copula models (Student-t and Gaussian). The left
panel illustrates that since the MVN approach does not take into account conditional
volatility, there is signicantly less variation in the VaR forecasts. During periods of
extreme returns, for example in October - December 2008, the model continuously
underestimates the risk. The second benchmark model, namely the univariate
AR-GARCH model for the portfolio returns, seems to provide reasonable forecasts
for the 99%-VaR. The right panel shows that also the considered copula models
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seem to provide an appropriate quantication of the 99%-VaR with only a small
number of VaR exceptions. At a rst glance, we also observe that there is only a
minor dierence with respect to VaR quantication between the Gaussian and the
Student-t copula model. A more rigourous analysis based on VaR exceptions and
distributional forecasts will be conducted in the following.
Figure 1.6: Portfolio returns and 99%-VaR forecasts for Portfolio 4
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Note: The VaR forecasts are based on using a univariate GARCH model for the portfolio return
series (red) and standard multivariate normal approach (green) (left panel) and for the conditional
copula model using a Student-t (red) and Gaussian (green) copula (right panel).
Given the estimated model parameters for the marginal distributions and
dependence structure, we are able to calculate a model-dependent condence interval
for the next observation of the portfolio return yt+1. Following Kupiec (1995),
Christoersen (1998) and Hull (2007), we evaluate the quality of the VaR forecasts
by comparing the nominal number of exceptions of the models to the true number of
exceptions. Because comparing the nominal and true coverage might be sensitive to
the choice of the condence level , we decided to investigate the coverage for three
dierent values of . For each of the models we calculate the VaR for the 95%,
99%, and 99.9% condence level. If the implied VaR forecasts are accurate, the
percentage of exceedances should be approximately 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
We further conduct a statistical test investigating whether a model provides an
acceptable number of VaR exceptions. The test is based on the binomial distribution
and simply investigates whether the number of exceedances is signicantly higher
than the expected number for p = 0:05, p = 0:01, and p = 0:001 (Hull, 2007). The
null hypothesis is that the model provides an adequate number of exceptions such
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that rejection of the null indicates that the model signicantly misspecies VaR
estimates.
Table 1.4: Testing dierent VaR specications
95% VaR 99% VaR 99:9% VaR
Portfolio # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction
PF1 Univariate 31 8.05%** 6 1.56% 3 0.78%**
PF2 Univariate 28 7.27%* 8 2.08%* 2 0.52%*
PF3 Univariate 31 8.05%** 8 2.08%* 2 0.52%*
PF4 Univariate 27 7.01%* 9 2.34%** 2 0.52%*
95% VaR 99% VaR 99:9% VaR
Portfolio # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction
PF1 MVN 25 6.49% 12 3.12%** 2 0.52%*
PF2 MVN 26 6.75% 9 2.34%** 2 0.52%*
PF3 MVN 28 7.67%* 14 3.64%** 6 1.56%**
PF4 MVN 28 7.67%* 11 2.86%** 6 1.56%**
95% VaR 99% VaR 99:9% VaR
Portfolio # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction
PF1 Gaussian 26 6.75% 6 1.56% 0 0.00%
PF2 Gaussian 24 6.23% 4 1.04% 1 0.26%
PF3 Gaussian 21 5.45% 5 1.30% 3 0.78%**
PF4 Gaussian 21 5.45% 3 0.78% 2 0.52%*
95% VaR 99% VaR 99:9% VaR
Portfolio # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction # Exc. Fraction
PF1 Student-t 26 6.75% 6 1.56% 0 0.00%
PF2 Student-t 24 6.23% 4 1.04% 0 0.00%
PF3 Student-t 21 5.45% 6 1.56% 1 0.26%
PF4 Student-t 21 5.45% 3 0.78% 1 0.26%
Note: Number and fraction of exceedances for 95%-, 99%-, and 99.9%-VaR for the multivariate
normal (MVN), the univariate GARCH model as well as the Gaussian and the Student-t copula
approach. The asterisk denote rejection of an appropriate VaR specication for specic condence
level at 1% ** and 5% * signicance (Hull, 2007).
With a total number of 385 days, the expected number of VaR exceptions
is approximately 19.25 for the 95%, 3.85 for the 99%, and 0.385 for the 99.9%
condence level. Table 1.4 reports the actual number and fraction of exceedances
as well as the results for the signicance test for the number of VaR exceptions.
We nd that for a vast majority of considered portfolios and condence levels the
copula models are superior to the benchmark models with respect to the dierence
between the actual and the expected number of exceedances.
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For the 95% condence level, all models provide a slightly higher number of
exceedances than expected. In particular for the portfolios containing investments
in commodities and equity (PF3 and PF4), the coverage is worse for the univariate
GARCH and the MVN model. For these portfolios, both copula approaches provide
a better estimation of the risk quantile and yield a lower number of exceptions than
the benchmark models. The conducted tests for VaR exceptions indicate that a
correct specication of VaR levels is rejected for Portfolio 3 and 4 at the 5%, often
even at the 1%, signicance level for the multivariate normal and the univariate
GARCH model. However, an appropriate specication of VaR for Portfolio 3 and 4
cannot be rejected for the Student-t copula at any of the considered VaR condence
level. For the 99% and 99.9% condence levels, the copula models seem to provide
better VaR estimates. Here, the univariate GARCH and the multivariate normal
approach do not yield appropriate VaR forecasts such that the observed number
of exceptions for any of the considered portfolios consistently exceeds the expected
number. Table 1.4 clearly illustrates that both copula models oer better results,
where the nominal number of exceptions for the considered condence levels is much
closer to the theoretical number.
Overall, with respect to backtesting the VaR models, the copula approach
consistently outperforms the multivariate normal model. The univariate GARCH
yields better results than the multivariate normal model but still shows a higher
number of exceptions than the copula models almost at all condence levels. In
comparison to the Gaussian copula, the Student-t copula provides very similar
results for the 95% and 99% condence levels and slightly better results at the
99.9% condence level. At this condence level, an appropriate VaR specication
is rejected for almost all portfolios for the two benchmark models, while it is only
rejected twice for the Gaussian copula and never for the Student-t copula. Therefore,
we conclude that the Student-t copula model provides the best results for the VaR
specication.
Distributional Forecasts
We investigate the ability of the models to provide accurate forecasts of the portfolio
return distribution. Tests that are based on the condence intervals might be
unstable as they are sensitive to the choice of the condence level . Therefore,
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we also apply tests that investigate the complete distributional forecast, instead of
a number of quantiles only. We perform a distributional test that evaluates the
accuracy of the density forecasts, following Crnkovic and Drachman (1996) and
Diebold et al. (1998). We are interested in the distribution of the return yt+1; t > 0
that is forecasted at time t. Let f(yt+1) be the probability density, and the associated
distribution function of yt+1 is denoted by:
(1.10) F (yt+1) =
yt+1Z
 1
f(x)dx:
To conduct the test, we determine F^ (yt+1) using the estimates for the marginal
return distributions and copula or correlation parameters from the rolling window
in-sample period. Based on this information, we can calculate a rolling forecast
of the portfolio return distribution for the next day. Given that F^ is the correct
forecast for the distribution, Rosenblatt (1952) shows that the transformation of yt:
(1.11) ut+1 =
yt+1Z
 1
f^(x)dx = F^ (yt+1);
is i.i.d. uniform on [0; 1]. Crnkovic and Drachman (1996) and Diebold et al. (1998)
provide tests that can be used to investigate violations of either independence or
uniformity in the forecasts.
Testing for uniformity, Crnkovic and Drachman (1996) suggest to use a test
based on the distance between the empirical and the theoretical cumulative distri-
bution function of the uniform distribution. This may be done using the Kuiper
statistic DKuiper = D
++D  with D+ = supfFn(u)  F^ (u)g and D  = supfF^ (u) 
Fn(u)g. Hereby, Fn(u) denotes the empirical distribution function for the probability
integral transforms of the one-day ahead return forecasts and F^ (u) the cdf of
the uniform distribution. Table 1.5 presents the results for the conducted tests.
Again, we nd that the Gaussian and the Student-t copula models generally provide
better results than the multivariate normal model and the univariate GARCH
model. Probability integral transforms of the one-day ahead return forecasts for
the multivariate normal model are non-uniformly distributed. For Portfolio 1, 2
and 3, the test rejects the hypothesis of a uniform distribution even at the 1%
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level while for Portfolio 4 the uniformity assumption is rejected at the 5% level.
In comparison to the univariate model, the Gaussian and the Student-t copula
model perform better for Portfolio 1 and 2, while the univariate model provides
the smallest distance to the uniform distribution for Portfolio 3 and 4. While
the appropriateness of the three models is not rejected for Portfolio 3 and 4, the
Student-t copula model is the only one that cannot be rejected at the 1% level for
Portfolio 1. For Portfolio 2, appropriate distributional forecasts are rejected for all
considered models. Furthermore, all models seem to provide better forecasts for
PF3 and PF4 with a higher share in equity indices, while they perform worse for
PF1 and PF2 consisting of commodity futures only. The Student-t copula model
clearly outperforms the multivariate normal model and seems to deliver slightly
better results than the univariate GARCH and the Gaussian copula approach.
Table 1.5: Kuiper test statistics
PF1 PF2 PF3 PF4
Univariate GARCH 0.1311** 0.1367** 0.0593 0.0577
Multivariate Normal 0.1183** 0.1149** 0.1121** 0.0985*
Gaussian Copula 0.1063** 0.1055** 0.0750 0.0710
Student-t Copula 0.0966* 0.1054** 0.0807 0.707
Note: Results for Kuiper test statistics. The asterisk denotes rejection of the model at the 1% **
and 5% * signicance level, for n=386 observations.
Overall, our results suggest that copula models are particularly useful for risk
management purposes and short-term forecasting of future return distributions for
portfolios containing investments in emission allowances. These results could be im-
portant not only for risk management or hedging, but also for the purpose of portfolio
optimisation. Deviating from the standard variance-covariance approach could be
of interest, in particular when higher moments of the portfolio return distribution
are considered or when risk-adjusted measures are used (Jondeau and Rockinger,
2006b; Keating and Shadwick, 2002). Note that our results were also robust when
alternative portfolio weights, combination of assets, and dierent window sizes for
the rolling estimation were considered.
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1.5 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter is to deepen the understanding of the relationship be-
tween European carbon, commodity, and nancial markets. We apply dierent
copulas to analyse the dependence structure between EUA futures returns and
those of other nancial assets and commodities during the Kyoto commitment
period. Copulas oer great exibility for modelling the relationship between dierent
nancial variables. The application of copulas also yields insights with respect
to non-linear dependence and tail dependence between the considered variables.
We rst investigate which copulas are most appropriate to model the dependence
structure. Second, we focus on the time-varying properties of the dependence
structure. The latter step allows us to examine whether the relationship has changed
over time and whether the nancial crisis had an inuence on the dependence
between EUA futures and other nancial variables. The usefulness of copulas is
further illustrated in a Value-at-Risk and density forecasting analysis. We consider
dierent portfolios combining investments in EUAs with several other assets and test
the Student-t as well as the Gaussian copula model against two benchmark models:
a standard variance-covariance approach and a univariate AR-GARCH model that
is applied directly to the portfolio returns.
The following insights emerge from these eorts. First, a signicant positive
dependence structure is found between EUA futures and coal, gas, and electricity
futures returns as well as between EUA futures and equity spot returns. Only
between EUA and oil futures we nd the dependence to be insignicant. Our results
contradict earlier studies by Kosobud et al. (2005) and Daskalakis et al. (2009)
suggesting no statistically signicant or even negative correlations between emission
allowances and other nancial variables. We conrm results by Mansanet-Bataller
et al. (2007) and Hintermann (2010) who nd a positive relationship between several
commodities and the emission allowance prices. Regarding the nature of dependence,
we nd evidence of a symmetric dependence structure between emission allowances
and other nancial assets. For the majority of the considered bivariate series, the
Student-t and the Gaussian copula are most appropriate, signicantly outperforming
the Clayton and the Gumbel copula with respect to a goodness-of-t test. Second,
we obtain interesting results on time-variation of the estimated copula parameters.
In particular, we nd a stronger dependence between EUA futures returns and
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most of the considered variables during the global nancial crisis. This conrms
general results on asset returns from nancial markets exhibiting higher dependence
during periods of extreme economic or market downturn. Finally, our risk analysis
illustrates that applying a standard variance-covariance approach to the multivariate
series is likely to underestimate the kurtosis and in particular the tail risk of the
portfolio return distribution. The application of an AR-GARCH model to the
portfolio returns also underestimates the risk in the lower extreme tail. A Student-t
copula model that generally performs better with respect to interval and density
forecasts than all the other considered models, including the implemented Gaussian
copula model, gives indication of some tail dependence.
In a nutshell, our results recommend copulas as an appropriate tool for de-
scribing the dependence structure between returns from EUA contracts and those
of other nancial variables. The application of copulas may be particularly useful for
risk management purposes and short-term forecasting for investments in a portfolio
containing emission allowances. Given the potential tail dependence, our ndings are
also relevant for investors or portfolio managers, in particular when higher moments
of the portfolio return distribution or risk-adjusted measures are considered.

Chapter 2
How Political is the European
Carbon Market? { Insights from
Conditional Jump Models
2.1 Introduction
As I have long-argued, investment in green energy will never be certain
unless we bring some stability to the price of carbon.
George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 2011
With the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, dierent climate policies
are implemented around the world. They range from command and control reg-
ulation to more market-based approaches. One renowned instrument is emissions
trading which establishes a quantitative emissions target and requires osetting
climate-active gases with tradable certicates. The European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), established in 2005, is currently by far the largest
existing carbon market. But in the meanwhile other trading schemes have devel-
oped: the rst compliance period of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, an
emissions trading initiative of ten north-eastern US states, has started in 2009. New
Zealand has an emissions trading scheme in place which is stepwise extended to
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more sectors, Australia will introduce carbon trading in 2015.1 Moreover, China
recently announced the implementation of six regional ETS by 2013.2
As more systems are set in place and policy makers aspire to link them, it is
necessary to gain condence that these systems spur emission abatement. Incentives
to reduce emissions are provided by the carbon price signal as already outlined
in the Introduction of this thesis. However, there are several reasons for concern
regarding the reliability of the price signal. First, Hintermann's (2010) paper nds
that fundamentals related to the marginal abatement costs, such as gas and coal
prices or weather variables, provide an insucient explanation of the carbon price
in Phase I of the EU ETS. Second, Gronwald et al.'s (2011) nding of a stronger
relationship between the European Allowance Unit (EUA) price and those of other
nancial commodities during the nancial crisis suggests that undesirable inuences
are present. Finally, concerns about price volatility in the newly established carbon
market have been raised repeatedly, especially since the price for a EUA dropped by
almost 50% in April 2006 (Chevallier, 2011b). Variation of the carbon price is the
central feature of emissions trading, but excessive volatility reduces the eciency
of this policy instrument (Fankhauser et al., 2010). A capricious price development
increases abatement cost uncertainty in the short-run and is possibly detrimental to
investments in the long-run. With a carbon price that is weakly connected to market
fundamentals and instable, the desired transition to a low-carbon economy might
be at risk. Therefore, policy makers and economists worry about the eciency of
emissions trading as a climate policy instrument. With the aim of improving the
European policy mechanism, it is necessary to better understand the carbon price
uctuations and their sources.
This chapter's aim is to deepen the understanding of the EUA price behaviour
in the EU ETS. The focus lies on the more detailed description of carbon price
volatility. Our main contribution is to disentangle the carbon price uctuation and
to provide new insights regarding the sources of these disturbances. The carbon
market literature has addressed various statistical features of the EUA price such as
volatility clustering or the occurrence of price jumps. This study goes beyond the
existing literature and treats these statistical features in an integrated approach by
applying Chan and Maheu's (2002) combined jump-GARCH model. This method
1More information is available at: www.climatechange.gov.au/government/reduce/carbon-
pricing.aspx.
2Reuters, 11.4.2011, China planning emissions trading in 6 regions, www.reuters.com.
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allows to systematically explain the volatility structure and to dierentiate between
smooth price uctuation and sudden, extreme price movements. Moreover, the
variance decomposition proposed by Nimalendran (1994) is employed to determine
which portion of the variance is attributable to jumps. The empirical strategy
helps to shed light into the dierent components of carbon price uctuation. More
importantly, explanations for the observed patterns are provided, particularly for
price jumps that disrupt the market most.
On the one hand, a smooth and continuous price uctuation is likely to arise
from market fundamentals providing steady information about the demand for
emission allowances. On the other hand, the high prevalence of jumps is probably
related to news which introduce unexpected or essential changes to the market
structure. Various studies show that markets, subject to political inuences, are
likely to exhibit extreme price movements, see in particular Jorion (1988). This
chapter investigates to what extent political events trigger jumps in the European
carbon market. In contrast to other commodity markets, the possibility to trade
emission rights is a purely political decision. As the policy framework is such an
essential feature to the market, it is a potential explanation for the dominance of
jumps in the carbon price. This is further motivated by previous research on the
EU ETS which nds a strong inuence of the regulatory framework and related
political decisions on the carbon price (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011; Chevallier,
2011b; Conrad et al., 2012). Therefore, the present analysis assesses which jumps are
related to decisions of the EU Commission or news from the international climate
change arena. Understanding how and why the carbon price develops, gives a sound
basis to possibly counteract the volatile price development.
The results can be summarised as follows. First, the jump-GARCH model pro-
vides a good t to the data and thus explains the capricious carbon price movements
well. Second, no fewer than 40% to 60% of the carbon price variance are attributable
to jumps. Third, a considerable number of the extreme price movements captured by
the model's jump component can be related to information regarding EUA supply
and changes in the administrative framework. This source of disturbance has not
been researched widely in the empirical literature. Given our results, it seems an
important information channel in a strongly regulated market.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 further
explains this study's contribution to the literature, Section 2.3 provides a description
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of the data and the empirical approach. Section 2.4 presents the estimation results
and the variance decomposition. Section 2.5 discusses the occurrence and source of
carbon price jumps. Finally, Section 2.6 ends by some concluding remarks.
2.2 Literature Overview
This chapter builds on two streams of empirical literature: studies assessing the car-
bon price determinants and studies analysing the carbon price behaviour. Generally,
the carbon price reects supply as well as demand information of EUAs (Cheval-
lier, 2011a). While the supply of emission rights is determined by the European
Commission who decides on the total cap and the nal allocation, the demand for
EUAs is related to the amount of emissions that rms need to cover. This, in turn,
depends on factors like weather conditions or dierences between the coal and the
gas price (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007). If the use of less carbon-intensive gas
becomes cheaper than the use of coal, power producers with switch-capacity can opt
for gas and therefore reduce their need for carbon allowances (Christiansen et al.,
2005; Chevallier, 2009). The weather, on the one hand, aects the availability of
renewable energy which can replace fossil energy sources (Hintermann, 2010; Rickels
et al., 2010). On the other hand, particularly hot and cold temperatures increase
the demand for air-conditioning or heating which thrives up the electricity demand.
Apart from these fundamentals, the literature is less clear about the driving
forces of the carbon price. The dependence with nancial markets has been discussed
controversially. Hintermann (2010) cannot nd a relationship of carbon with the
British FTSE equity index during the rst trading phase. Chevallier (2009) shows
that dierent variables from stock and bond markets have little inuence on EUA
futures. However, Daskalakis et al. (2009) identify negative correlations of carbon
futures with equity market returns in Phase I. Notwithstanding this debate, the
relationship between the EUA market and other nancial markets grew stronger
during the period of the nancial crisis (Gronwald et al., 2011).3
Many explanations for carbon price changes have been given, but Hintermann
(2010) shows that these demand-side fundamentals provide an insucient explana-
tion of the EUA development in Phase I. To better explain the carbon price, the
3For a more detailed discussion, the reader is referred to Chapter 1.
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regulatory framework and related decisions need to be included in a price model.
The existing literature has touched upon this issue by assessing the eect of NAP
decisions on the carbon price (Chevallier, 2011b; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011;
Conrad et al., 2012). In addition, Alberola and Chevallier (2009) emphasise the
importance of the regulation which bans the transfer of allowances from Phase I to
Phase II. Furthermore, Neuho et al. (2006) illustrate which distortions can arise
depending on the allocation mechanism of EUAs. This study will provide further
insights into the importance of such regulatory events.
Regarding the behaviour of the carbon price, the most relevant results for this
chapter arise from papers by Paolella and Taschini (2008), Benz and Truck (2009),
Chevallier (2011b), and Daskalakis et al. (2009). As a common feature, these papers
apply univariate time series approaches to investigate the empirical properties of
the EUA price. While the former papers provide evidence of a GARCH structure
in carbon price returns, Daskalakis et al. (2009) show that EUA futures prices are
characterised by jumps. Jumps are also included in the framework of Chevallier
and Sevi (2010) when modelling the implied volatility of carbon price returns.
In contrast to previous studies, the present analysis treats jumps and conditional
heteroscedasticity in a single approach to explain the carbon price behaviour. Chan
and Maheu's (2002) autoregressive jump intensity (ARJI-)GARCH model is applied
to EUA futures returns covering both Phase I and II.
Since the prevalence of jumps has been emphasised in the literature, the ARJI-
GARCH lends itself well to capture the uctuations present in the series. The model
allows to dierentiate between smooth price movements and more disruptive ones.
The latter is captured by the model's jump component which identies sudden,
extreme market uctuations exceeding the usually observed price movements. Most
importantly, the intensity of jumps can vary over time and allows tracking when
jumps happened. The derived jump series is purely data-driven as it does not
require any pre-specication which sample period to study or which events cause
price spikes. By contrast, Sanin and Violante (2009) take ex-ante decisions regarding
the events that potentially cause price jumps and then include these in their model.
The ARJI-GARCH therefore provides an unbiased measure of jumps in Phase I and
II of the EU ETS. Moreover, the contribution of jumps to the total volatility is
assessed by employing Nimalendram's (1994) variance decomposition procedure.
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2.3 Data and Model
Figure 2.1 illustrates the development of the EUA futures price from May 2005 to
April 2011.4 The EUA futures initially traded at levels between 20 to 30e. When
the market learned about the oversupply with emission allowances in April 2006, the
carbon price crashed. Until mid 2007, it did not recover and traded around 20e.
With the beginning of 2008 (Phase II), however, the EUA futures price rose back
to levels between 25e and 30e. During the economic crises, the market nally
experienced a second large price decline. The price depression was less abrupt,
but the EUA futures were steadily pushed below 10e. Together with the levels
of production, demand for allowances declined, and excess allowances were sold to
quickly access liquidity. In autumn 2009, the price picked up again and traded
between 10e and 15e, probably driven by allowance demand for Phase III.
Figure 2.1: European Union Allowance 2011 futures prices
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Source: Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) London.
The quantile-quantile plot displayed in Figure 2.2 vividly illustrates that ex-
treme price movements are present, and an empirical model needs to be able to
account for this behaviour. Almost every nancial market variable is characterised
4The data is obtained from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) London.
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by times of high volatility followed by more tranquil periods. This price behaviour
is referred to as volatility clustering.
Figure 2.2: Quantile-quantile plot
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A generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model,
as introduced by Bollerslev (1986), is able to capture this behaviour by allowing
the conditional variance to change over time. GARCH models are able to depict
the smooth volatility patterns but cannot explain large discrete price movements.
To include volatility clustering as well as discrete price spikes, Chan and Maheu's
(2002) ARJI-GARCH approach is used to describe the EUA price movements. It
extends a traditional GARCH model by a conditional-jump component which also
inuences the overall volatility. The ARJI-GARCH has been successfully applied to
stock market indices (Chan and Maheu, 2002), exchange rates (Chan, 2003, 2004),
and the oil price (Lee et al., 2010; Gronwald, 2012). As asserted above, the carbon
market is heavily inuenced by political decisions which supply the market with
new information in a discrete manner. The application of a jump model is a natural
choice when assuming that these events represent a potential source of discrete
price movements (Jorion, 1988; McCurdy and Maheu, 2004). The following model
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is considered:
(2.1) yt = +
lX
i=1
iyt i +
p
htzt +
ntX
k=1
Xt;k
where yt is the EUA return and zt  NID(0; 1).
p
htzt contains the GARCH(p,q)
term ht (Bollerslev, 1986) which follows an ARMA process:
5
(2.2) ht = ! +
qX
i=1
i
2
t i +
pX
i=1
iht i:
The last expression in Equation 2.1 represents the so-called jump compo-
nent. The conditional jump size Xt;k, given the history of observations t 1 =
fyt 1; : : : ; y1g, is assumed to be normally distributed with mean t and variance 2t :
Xt;k  N(t; 2t ). The number of jumps nt that arrive between t   1 and t follow a
Poisson distribution with t > 0:
(2.3) P (nt = jjt i) = 
j
t
j!
e t ;
where t measures the jump intensity that captures the average number of jumps
in a time interval. Two variants of the model are considered here: a constant jump
intensity model with t = , t = , and 
2
t = 
2, and a time-varying jump intensity
model. For the case of the latter, t is assumed to follow the autoregressive process:
(2.4) t = 0 +
rX
i=1
it i +
sX
i=1
it i:
The conditional jump intensity is changing over time inuenced by the previous jump
intensity t i. This persistence parameter illustrates the occurrence of jump clusters.
When many jumps are expected today, the number of jumps tomorrow is expected to
be high as well. For stationarity, jj < 1. Furthermore, the jump intensity is driven
by new innovation t i. This jump intensity residual is an unpredictable component
or jump innovation entering Equation 2.4. The empirical strategy of Chan and
Maheu (2002) is to infer the probability of j jumps at time t  i, P (nt i = jjt i),
5For details regarding the basic GARCH model, please refer to Chapter 3 or Enders (2004).
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ex post from the observed returns by using a lter.6 The derived jump distribution
is compared to the expectation regarding the number of jumps, t i, based on
information at time t   i   1. The unexpected component is captured by t i
which changes the forecast regarding the number of jumps when the information
set is updated from t   i   1 to t   i. The proposed jump distribution has two
main advantages. First, the ARMA structure is a exible parametrisation to model
dierent autoregressive dynamics. Second, the jump intensity changes endogenously,
and uctuation is derived from the data only (Chan and Maheu, 2002). t measures
the expected number of jumps conditional on information t i, but independent
from other market variables.
Finally, let 2 denote the total variance of yt. According to Nimalendran
(1994), 2 can be decomposed in the diusion-induced and the jump-induced vari-
ance and be written as follows:
(2.5) 2 = ht + t(
2 + 2):
This decomposition allows one to study the share of jumps in the total variance. As
in the time-varying version of the jump-GARCH model, the decomposition analysis
yields a exible measure of jump development over time.
2.4 Estimation Results
The estimation is based on the EUA 2011 futures series from 2005 to 2011. The
model is estimated in rst log-dierences and a constant is included. Table 2.1
provides the estimation results for the constant and the time-varying jump intensity
models.7 The results for the GARCH component are depicted in the upper part
of Table 2.1. The conditional variance exhibits strong persistence with  ranging
between 0.82 and 0.86. The GARCH parameters take similar values in both spec-
ications and assure a well-behaved variance: all coecients are positive and full
the restriction of + < 1. The results for the jump component are shown in the
lower part of Table 2.1. It is evident that all jump parameters are highly signicant.
6For a more thorough discussion of the method, the reader is referred to the original paper by
Chan and Maheu (2002).
7The estimations are calculated in R and Eviews.
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This already demonstrates that the jump-augmented GARCH model is appropriate
for modelling carbon price returns. For both models  indicates that jumps in the
carbon market are on average negative and therefore have some dampening eect
on returns. In the constant jump model  is 0.2. Allowing for time dependence
in the expected arrival rate of jumps, gives further insights about its development.
The uctuation of the time-varying jump intensity is illustrated in Figure 2.3: t
ranges from zero to 2.5. At times no jumps are expected, in contrast to periods
where several jumps are likely. The t process is highly persistent with  reaching
0.88 and therefore indicates the occurrence of jump clusters.
Table 2.1: Constant and time-varying jump intensity models
Parameter Constant ARJI
1.4E-03 1.7E-03

(0.0086) (0.0010)
1.1E-05 1.3E-05
!
(0.0241) (0.0034)
0.1039 0.0571

(<0.0001) (0.0013)
0.8227 0.8602

(<0.0001) (<0.0001)
0.0297 0.0268

(<0.0001) (<0.0001)
-7.0E-03 -5.6E-03

(0.0438) (0.0349)
0.2003 0.0427

(0.0180) (0.0431)
0.8806
 -
(<0.0001)
0.4819
 -
(0.0035)
Note:  is the constant, !;  and  are the usual GARCH parameters. The jump parameters are
displayed in the bottom part of the table. The jump mean and variance are denoted by  and
.  denotes the jump intensity which follows an ARMA process with parameters  and  in the
time-varying model. p-values are in parentheses.
In comparison to a simple GARCH model, the extended jump-GARCH models
clearly improve the model t. The model selection criteria for a simple GARCH
model (estimated as benchmark) and the augmented models show that the latter
should be preferred (Table 2.2). All three criteria, the AIC, BIC and HQ indicate
a better performance of jump-augmented GARCH models. A likelihood-ratio (LR)
test is conducted to emphasise these results. The LR test allows to compare two
nested models and to evaluate whether an extended (unrestricted) model outper-
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Table 2.2: Model selection criteria
Information criteria
Criterion GARCH Constant ARJI
LogL 3,588.263 3,639.028 3,648.04
AIC -4.716 -4.779 -4.788
BIC -4.702 -4.754 -4.757
HQ -4.711 -4.770 -4.776
Likelihood-ratio test
Compared models Test statistic
101.53
Constant vs. GARCH
(<0.0001)
119.55
ARJI vs. GARCH
(<0.0001)
Note: AIC is short for Akaike's Information Criterion, BIC for Bayesian Information Criterion and
HQ for Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. p-values are in parentheses.
forms a simple (restricted) model. The distance between the log likelihoods of
both models is calculated and then tested whether this dierence is statistically
signicant. The test statistic is 2-distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of restrictions. If the null hypothesis is rejected, a model without restrictions
increases the log likelihood signicantly (Verbeek, 2008). Hence, the results in Table
2.2 show that the jump-augmented specications provide a better model t than a
simple GARCH model. The LR test for the constant versus the time-varying model
is non-standard and therefore not explicitly reported (Chan and Maheu, 2002). The
LR test statistic of 18.02 should be large enough to indicate an improvement of the
model t for the time-varying model.
Figure 2.3 also displays the share of the EUA variance that is triggered by
jumps, based on Nimalendran's (1994) variance decomposition procedure. Careful
analysis of the decomposed variance yields interesting insights into the functioning
of this market. After the rst turbulent months, the portion of variance triggered by
jumps is generally found to uctuate around 50%. Only in two cases this portion falls
below 40%: in the aftermath of the 2006 price drop and during the price recovery
that followed the nancial crisis' price collapse.8 The variance generally increased
during these periods but a larger portion of this increased variance is captured by
the GARCH component of the model. This is plausible as the respective movements
8The variance share also drops below 40% in early 2005. As this was an extremely early stage
of the EU ETS, price movements of that time should not be deemed very meaningful, see e.g.
Hintermann (2010).
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do not reect reactions to single events, but rather price movements in a \nervous"
carbon market. Comparing these values to those obtained in other applications
of Chan and Maheu's (2002) method clearly indicates that price jumps play an
important role in the EU ETS. Gronwald's (2011) study of the oil market shows that
in periods after 1998 the portion of variance triggered by jumps is about 30%, while
this portion is found to be about 50% during the 1980s. At rst, the oil market
was characterised by a generally tranquil price movement with only few extreme
movements while later periods were generally more volatile with less inuence of
single events. Hence, carbon price behaviour seems to be similar to the behaviour of
the oil price during the 1980s. What is more, Huang et al. (2007) nd that less than
30% of the variance in the Taiwanese stock index is triggered by jumps. During the
election period, when the political uncertainty is particularly high and jumps are
more likely to occur, this share increases to around 40%.
To summarise, the application of Chan and Maheu's (2002) method yields
strong evidence of conditional jumps in the emission allowance price. The EUA price
is not only characterised by conditional heteroscedasticity but is also subject to large
price movements which occur with time-varying intensity. A considerable portion
of the total variance is triggered by jumps. It is therefore worthwhile studying the
underlying causes of these price jumps.
2.5 Role of Policy
It is a purely political decision that CO2 is a tradable asset. In comparison to
other commodity markets, the carbon market exhibits much stronger ties with
its policy and regulatory frameworks. Various studies show that markets with
strong political inuence are more likely to exhibit extreme price movements (Jorion,
1988). This chapter investigates to what extent policy events in the carbon market
trigger the jumps identied in the previous section. A number of studies show that
the EC decisions on National Allocation Plans (NAPs) inuence the EUA price
(Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011; Conrad et al., 2012). Furthermore, the importance
of banking, when EUAs are kept for future compliance periods, and the importance
of the allowance allocation mechanism have been emphasised (Neuho et al., 2006;
Alberola and Chevallier, 2009; Chevallier, 2012). This line of research is extended
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Figure 2.3: EUA prices, jump intensity and variance decomposition
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by the present study as it assesses to which extent such regulatory decisions lead to
extreme price jumps.
For this purpose, a data base has been developed which captures important
decisions by the European Commission as well as changes in the global carbon
market framework. These events are assigned to dierent categories. The group
EU ETS NAPs summarises decisions by the European Commission on the supply
with EUAs in Phase II through so-called National Allocation Plans. EU ETS
Compliance lists the publication dates of compliance and emissions data which
regularly inform the market about EU ETS demand. The category EU ETS III
consists of the main decisions regarding the EU ETS framework and supply with
EUAs in Phase III. Similarly, the category Global Carbon Market covers inuential
events in the international carbon market. Some categories are easier to complete
than others. NAP decisions or compliance data publication are well known and have
a regular pattern. By contrast, the categories EU ETS III andGlobal Carbon Market
are harder to record as these events are more divers and not pre-scheduled. To
obtain a coherent list, regular carbon market publications by CDC Climat Research,
Euractiv, and Unicredit as well as the European Commission's communication have
been considered.9 Tables of the selected events can be found in Annex A.
To study the temporal connection between regulatory events and the depicted
jumps, Figures 2.4 to 2.7 present the respective time series from 2007 to 2010. Each
upper panel presents the jump-related variance share derived from the decomposition
analysis, while the lower panel shows the time-varying jump intensity from the
GARCH model. The rst observation from these graphs is that the jump intensity
as well as the jump-induced variance exhibit dierent phases over time. The years
2007 and 2010 appear less steady as there are considerably more sharp spikes in the
jump measures. In 2008 and 2009, with the beginning of Phase II and the nancial
crisis, the movements of the jump intensity measures were more sedate.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the results for the year 2007 which was dominated by
the EC's decisions regarding so-called National Allocation Plans (NAPs). NAPs
determined the nal supply with allowances in Phase II and therefore conveyed fun-
damental information. Figure 2.4 shows that EU ETS NAPs events coincided with
sudden carbon price changes in 2007. This result is generally in line with the existing
9Available at: www.bluenext.eu/publications/tendances.html; www.euractiv.de;
www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets.
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Figure 2.4: Jumps and regulatory events 2007
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Note: The upper panel shows the jump-related variance share in per cent, the lower panel the
GARCH jump intensity measure. Both measures are combined with the same event variables:
EU ETS III (light blue), EU ETS NAPs (pink), EU ETS compliance (green) and Global Carbon
Market (orange). Source: see Tables A.1 to A.4 in Annex A.
literature (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011; Sanin and Violante, 2009). Information
regarding NAPs, however, was not only inuential in 2007. The European Court's
decision on 23. September 2009 that Estonia and Poland obtained to few EUAs in
their original allocation, led to an EUA price drop.
The importance of the NAP events shows that information about EU ETS
supply is crucial for market participants. The inuence of the demand side can
also be evaluated when concentrating on the EU ETS compliance events. Every
spring, the European Commission publishes two sets of information: the emissions
data at the beginning of April and the amount of surrendered EUAs in a press
release mid of May. These publications clarify whether installations are over- or
undersupplied with allowances. In 2006, this information led to the distinct price
crash shown in Figure 2.1. After 2007, the publication of emissions data has not
surprised the market. This can be depicted when concentrating on the green lines
in each graph which do not overlap with the jumps. Accordingly, the demand side
has been more predictable after the market adjusted in 2006. This conrms the
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Figure 2.5: Jumps and regulatory events 2008
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Note: The upper panel shows the jump-related variance share in per cent, the lower panel the
GARCH jump intensity measure. Both measures are combined with the same event variables:
EU ETS III (light blue), EU ETS NAPs (pink), EU ETS compliance (green) and Global Carbon
Market (orange). Source: see Tables A.1 to A.4 in Annex A.
expectation of Seifert et al. (2008) who conclude that market participants have had
a better estimate of EUA demand after the rst EU ETS emissions report in 2006.
In 2008, only a few decisive events changed the price pattern. The adoption
of the EU Climate Package on 23. January 2008 and the supportive vote of the EU
Parliament's environment committee on the EU's climate policy in early October
seemed to move the market. These decisions emphasised the European ambitions to
implement a rigourous climate policy. Another small jump can be observed on 16.
October 2008, when the link between the registries ITL und CITL was announced.
The events in 2008 represented important landmarks for the future of the carbon
market and attracted the traders' attention in an otherwise rather silent phase.
In 2009, the market was very interested in the decisions regarding aviation.
Several steps needed to be taken before the ight sector can be included in 2012,
and the market received many new signals related to this extension of the market
scope. Moreover, surprising news came from the international arena: Russia was
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Figure 2.6: Jumps and regulatory events 2009
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Note: The upper panel shows the jump-related variance share in per cent, the lower panel the
GARCH jump intensity measure. Both measures are combined with the same event variables:
EU ETS III (light blue), EU ETS NAPs (pink), EU ETS compliance (green) and Global Carbon
Market (orange). Source: see Tables A.1 to A.4 in Annex A.
expelled from the international carbon trade and the COP15 climate conference in
Copenhagen could not live up to global expectations.
The year 2010 was exceptionally eventful. In the beginning of 2010, unusual
news moved the carbon market. The debate about the mistakes in IPCC reporting
and the phishing attack of European registries agitated the public. Another concern
was the so-called CER recycling in March when it became obvious that governments
sold CERs which had already been submitted for compliance before.10 From mid-
year onwards, the market reacted sensitively to news regarding the cap in Phase III
as well as to auctioning decisions. Both were crucial events because they updated
market participants about the future supply with EUA allowances. Finally, a spurt
of the carbon price can be observed when HFC projects were banned from the
international and the European carbon market in summer 2010.
10For more information, please check: CMIA, 12.3.2010, CER recycling will damage credibility
of EU member states and depress CER and EUA prices, www.cmia.net.
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Figure 2.7: Jumps and regulatory events 2010
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Note: The upper panel shows the jump-related variance share in per cent, the lower panel the
GARCH jump intensity measure. Both measures are combined with the same event variables:
EU ETS III (light blue), EU ETS NAPs (pink), EU ETS compliance (green) and Global Carbon
Market (orange). Source: see Tables A.1 to A.4 in Annex A.
Table 2.3 underlines that the presented event series can explain the jumps we
derived using the jump-GARCH model. The dierent categories from our database
are used as explanatory variables in a regression for the t series. Except for the
EU ETS compliance variable, all event categories are signicant and show a positive
sign. Hence, the regulatory events inuence the carbon price jumps to a certain
extent. The Volatility Index measures the implied volatility of Standard and Poor
500 options and is used to proxy overall market volatility.
The results of this event analysis depict that decisions regarding the availability
and the restrictions of EUAs are important information for the carbon market. The
existing literature only focused on the NAP decisions in Phase II. These decisions
are key regulatory events but not the only source of turbulence. The EUA allocation
decisions for Phase III also introduced new information. Moreover, news regarding
the global carbon market design have an astonishingly strong feed-back on the EUA
price. This study shows that price spikes are not only related to decisions on EUA
allocation. Some events are related to the administration of the EU ETS, for example
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Table 2.3: Using regulatory events to explain jumps
Category Coecient
0.157
c
(<0.0001)
0.139
Global Carbon Market
(0.0176)
0.095
EU ETS NAPs
(0.0442)
0.144
EU ETS III
(0.0306)
0.024
EU ETS compliance
(0.7221)
0.007
Volatility Index
(<0.0001)
Adjusted R2 0.129
Log likelihood 177.958
AIC -0.321
BIC -0.293
Note: OLS regression with the t as dependent variable using heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors. The Volatility Index is calculated by the Chicago Board Options Exchange. p-values are
in parentheses.
the phishing attack on the registries or the recycled CERs. Such incidents are bound
to happen in a newly established scheme, but they can be prevented if regulators
learn from these events. Finally, not all regulatory events lead to price jumps, and
some of the large jumps cannot be explained by our database. Still, visual inspection
shows that the selected events often coincide with the detected price spikes. The
regression analysis for the event categories conrms that the chosen regulatory and
policy news can help explain the jump intensity movements.
All this underlines that inuences from the political arena drive the carbon
price development, in addition to fundamentals like commodity prices or economic
development. However, the nature of this institutional price driver is dierent.
Political and regulatory events seem to take eect in a discrete manner rather than
to steadily inuence the price. Market participants who are used to hedge risk in
other commodity markets have to deal with an additional source of uncertainty. This
is mainly problematic because political risks are dicult to evaluate and to manage
(Grubb and Newberry, 2008). Market risks are potentially easier to diversify than
discrete events related to the regulatory framework.
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The European Commission should therefore aim to provide a transparent and
secure policy environment for market participants. Changes with respect to the
EUA supply, allocation rules, or the acceptance of CDM credits should be kept at a
minimum. The EC decision to announce the overall EUA allocation in Phase III by a
single cap, instead of publishing 29 individual NAPs, is a step in the right direction.
The same information is conveyed, but in a less interfering manner. Moreover,
the regulator should opt for long commitment periods regarding the emissions cap
(Hepburn, 2006). The longer commitment period for Phase III, which runs for 8
and not 5 years, is a positive development. Adjusting the EUA supply during the
commitment period would give the impression that discretionary policy changes are
an option and unsettle market participants. It is rather recommended to set and
to respect clear rules when adjustments to the EUA supply are to be expected.
Otherwise, the policy's credibility and eciency is at risk (Hepburn, 2006).
2.6 Conclusions
Emissions trading seems to be the prevalent policy to reduce carbon emissions.
Theoretical arguments state that emissions trading is a cost-ecient approache to
reduce carbon emissions and that it provides dynamic incentives to adapt existing
abatement technologies and to develop new ones (Hahn and Stavins, 1992). Even
more important, establishing a market for emission rights might be politically easier
to enforce than the introduction of carbon taxes (Hepburn, 2006; Tiedenberg and
Lewis, 2008). However, the main criticism of cap-and-trade schemes relates to the
volatility of the carbon price (Parry and Pizer, 2007; Chevallier, 2011b). To validate
these statements, it is of particular importance to analyse the performance of existing
systems and to have a sucient understanding of the emission allowances price and
its determinants. As the globally largest cap-and-trade system, the EU ETS, has
been in operation for almost 8 years now, an increasing number of studies has been
using data from this market to investigate its performance.
This study sheds light on the behaviour of the carbon price by applying Chan
and Maheu's (2002) jump-augmented GARCH model to the EU ETS. The empirical
results clearly indicate that the EUA price is characterised by both GARCH and
strong conditional jump behaviour { in Phase I and Phase II. Based on the estimation
results, it is shown that a considerable portion of the variance, between 40 and 60
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per cent, are triggered by jumps. Studying the underlying reasons of these price
jumps yields valuable insights in the functioning of the European carbon market.
It is shown that a considerable amount of extreme EUA price movements is related
to new information regarding emissions allowance supply. This is epitomised by the
price reactions in response to the announcements of the EU ETS NAPs and equally
the EU ETS cap for Phase III. However, information regarding the EUA demand
seems less inuential. The carbon price peaks when relevant news from the global
carbon market is released as international carbon credits can be used for compliance
in the EU ETS. The policy framework appears to be an essential driver of carbon
price developments.
Another market, which is also under strong inuence of regulatory authorities,
is the money market. The central bank controls the base rate with the aim of
achieving low ination (European Central Bank) and possibly additional goals such
as the general economic performance (US Federal Reserve Bank). The vast literature
on monetary policy discusses optimal central bank behaviour. It is often argued that,
in addition to controlling the level of ination, a central bank should also ensure
that ination volatility is not overly large as this would have negative consequences
for economic growth (Friedman, 1977; Sack and Wieland, 2000; Rudebusch, 2002).
The same can be said for the carbon market. Here, the regulator inuences
the level and the volatility of the carbon price by setting an emissions cap. At
the same time, the carbon price is an important determinant of investments in
abatement technology. The price level is a crucial parameter for the protability
of abatement techniques. In addition, an unduly volatile carbon price makes the
investment decision more complex. This chapter's results show that the regulator
has some scope in this regard and that controlling price volatility does not seem out
of reach. The authorities should keep in mind that the EUA price is easily disrupted
by their decisions. Regulatory changes should be kept to a minimum. Therefore,
the transition in Phase III from 29 individual NAPs to a single cap decision is a
welcome move. The same information is conveyed, but in a less interfering manner.
The European Commission should further, similar to a central bank, monitor the
carbon price level and its uctuations. Decisions on essential framework parameters
should be clearly communicated and implemented in a transparent and credible
manner. The experiences from central bank policy should not be neglected. For
monetary policy, clearly communicated policy goals play an important role to steer
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market expectations. A good example is the current record low of the EUA price
which induces speculation regarding a set-aside of allowances or a more ambitious
European emissions reduction target of 30% until 2020. This is precisely the sort
of debate which is undesired as it leads to uncertainty about future policy. A more
clear communication by the European Commission would assure market participants
that no discretionary policy changes will be taken.
One of the main criticisms concerning existing carbon markets is their price
uncertainty. Emissions trading schemes are established in many parts of the world
and probably the most realistic policy option to combat climate change. Therefore,
it would be advisable to counteract this criticism.
Chapter 3
The Impact of Wind Power
Generation on the Electricity
Price in Germany
3.1 Introduction
Renewable electricity has come to dominate the debate over and the development of
the European electricity market. Among European countries, most wind turbines
and solar panels are installed in Germany where renewable electricity has become
even more important since the March 2011 decision regarding the nuclear phase-out.
Figure 3.1 shows that Germany's wind capacity reached 29 gigawatt (GW) in 2011.
Its solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity soared in the last two years: overall installed
solar PV capacity reached almost 25 GW in 2011 (BMU, 2012). In 2011, wind
electricity accounted for 8 per cent of gross electricity production in Germany, solar
PV for 3 per cent. All renewable sources combined made up 20 per cent of gross
electricity production in 2011 and are Germany's second most important source of
electricity generation after lignite (BDEW, 2011). The German government plans to
raise this share to 35 per cent by 2020 and to 50 per cent by 2030 (BMU and BMWi,
2011). Onshore and oshore wind will play an important role in this expansion of
renewable electricity capacity.
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Figure 3.1: Installed capacity and generated electricity in Germany
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System and market operators face two main challenges as more renewable
power generation is added. First, electricity generated by wind turbines and photo-
voltaic panels is intermittent and hardly adjustable to electricity demand.1 There-
fore, variable electricity generation is not a perfect substitute for conventional energy
sources. Figure 3.2 shows the variability of wind electricity generation. The horizon-
tal line, the so-called capacity credit, gives an impression how much conventional
capacity can be replaced by the existing wind power capacity, given the current
power plant eet and maintaining the security of supply (IEA, 2011).2 The graph
illustrates that the wind power generation is subject to strong variation and that only
a fraction of installed wind capacity, depicted by the capacity credit line, is expected
to contribute to the power mix with certainty. Second, Germany's renewable energy
policy grants priority dispatch and xed feed-in taris for renewable electricity
generation. Renewable electricity can be fed into the grid whenever it is produced,
1By contrast, electricity generation from hydro or biomass sources can be managed more
easily. The following conclusions hold for sources like wind and solar PV where intermittency
is particularly pronounced.
2In line with calculations from Hulle (2009), IEA (2011), and Schaber et al. (2012), the capacity
credit is assumed to be 6%. A wind installation of 29075 MW in 2011 was used in the calculation
for this capacity credit line (BMU, 2012).
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regardless of energy demand, and in-feed can be switched o only if grid stability
is at risk (Bundesnetzagentur, 2011).3 As storage is not yet a viable option, high
levels of variable renewable electricity production can be balanced only by adjusting
output from traditional power plants or by exporting excess electricity. Similarly,
when too little wind or sunshine is available during times of peak demand, reserve
capacity has to be dispatched at higher costs.
Figure 3.2: Hourly wind in-feed
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Note: Hourly wind in-feed in MW. The horizontal line illustrates how much electricity German
wind installations (29075 MW in 2011) are expected to reliably generate during peak demand.
This measure is referred to as capacity credit. In line with calculations from IEA (2011), Schaber
et al. (2012) and Hulle (2009) the capacity credit is assumed to be 6%. Source: www.eeg-kwk.de.
Grid operators are obliged to feed-in renewable electricity independent of the
market price. However, the spot electricity price is not independent from renewable
electricity. On the one hand, variable renewable power production is negatively cor-
related with the electricity price. Whenever large volumes of intermittent renewable
electricity are fed into the power grid, the electricity price tends to decline. As
renewable installations are very capital-intensive but have almost zero operational
generation cost, they are certainly dispatched to meet demand. More expensive
conventional power plants are crowded out, and the electricity price declines. This
dampening of the wholesale electricity price is called merit-order eect. Various
assessments uncover this eect for wind electricity generation (Neubarth et al., 2006;
3The operator continues to receive feed-in tari payments even if the installation is disconnected
from the grid due to capacity constraints of transmission cables.
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Nicolosi, 2010; Ray et al., 2010). Due to increasing production levels, the merit-order
eect can also be observed for solar PV electricity (Milstein and Tishler, 2011). On
the other hand, intermittent renewable power not only inuences price level, but
also price volatility (Klinge Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010; Cramton and Ockenfels,
2011). This is conrmed by Jonsson et al. (2010) and Woo et al. (2011) who show
that wind generation tends to lower the spot price but increase its variance. The
aim of this chapter is to further investigate the eects of intermittent wind power
generation on the electricity price development in Germany.
The literature shows that wind power generation has a dampening eect on
the electricity price but does not explicitly model the impact of wind power on the
volatility of the electricity price nor elaborate on the development of this relationship
over time. The present analysis introduces daily levels of German wind power
generation as explanatory variable in the mean and the variance equation of a
GARCH model of the German day-ahead electricity price.4 This study makes two
contributions to the literature. First, it explores the eect of wind power generation
on the level and volatility of the electricity price in an integrated approach. In
Germany, where renewables prospered exceptionally from feed-in taris, the eect
on the electricity market should be particularly pronounced. Second, it investigates
a regulatory change in the German marketing mechanism of renewable electricity
and its impact on the relationship between wind power and the electricity price.
This study's ndings suggest that wind power generation decreased the whole-
sale electricity price in Germany in the period from 2006 to 2011 but increased
the price volatility. These results are particularly important given European and
German aspirations to usher an energy system dominated by renewables. A low and
volatile electricity price might alter or delay investment decisions in new capacity,
renewable and conventional, required for the transformation of the energy system.
To advance the energy transformation, it should therefore be in the interest of policy
makers to secure a reliable and predictable electricity price. The present analysis
shows that adjusting the electricity market design can stabilise the development of
the electricity price to some extent. Price volatility reduced in Germany after a
modication to the renewable electricity regulation.
4The wind in-feed is estimated in megawatt hours (MWh) per day. Data on solar PV in-feed are
only available a much shorter period from 2010 onwards. Due to data restrictions, the impact of
solar PV electricity is not explicitly estimated in this chapter. It would be interesting to evaluate
this issue at a later point in time.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 summarises
the relevant literature on the interaction of wind power generation and the electricity
price. Section 3.3 describes the data, Section 3.4 the employed methods. The
results are presented and discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 gives some policy
recommendations and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Overview
It is widely argued that electricity from variable renewable energy sources { wind and
solar PV { is hard to incorporate in the generation mix. Although the interruptive
eect of variable wind electricity can already be observed today, little empirical
research evaluates its current inuence on the wholesale electricity price.
Most studies employ power system models to simulate the eect of increased
var-RE production on the level of electricity price. In the short term, the so-called
merit-order eect is quantied as the dierence between a simulated electricity price
with and without the renewable in-feed.5 For Germany, Bode and Groscurth (2006)
and Sensfu (2011) nd that renewable power generation lowers the electricity
price. Despite being very capital-intensive, renewable installations have almost
zero marginal generation cost and thus are certainly dispatched to meet demand.
More expensive conventional power plants are crowded out, and the electricity price
declines. This dampening of the wholesale electricity price is also shown for Denmark
(Munksgaard and Morthorst, 2008) and Spain (Saenz de Miera et al., 2008). A recent
literature overview of the merit-order eect in the European context is provided by
Ray et al. (2010). Taking a more long-term perspective, Green and Vasilakos (2010)
and Poyry (2011) simulate the eects of uctuating renewable electricity for the next
two decades. Green and Vasilakos (2010) nd that the British electricity price level
will be signicantly aected by variable wind power generation in 2020. Poyry (2011)
reports a strong merit-order eect by 2030 that decreases the wholesale electricity
price. The consumer price is expected to rise due to soaring costs for subsidies to
renewable electricity. Both studies conclude that the volatility of electricity price
will increase remarkably in the next 10 to 20 years.
5The merit-order eect can be observed for the wholesale price but not for the end-use price
which also reects the increasing costs for renewables support and for investments in the electricity
grid. The end-use price does therefore not necessarily decrease.
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Very few papers investigate the importance of intermittent renewable power
production for the electricity price using current market data. Neubarth et al.
(2006) evaluate the relationship between wind and price for Germany using an OLS
regression model. Woo et al. (2011) estimate an AR(1) model for high-frequency
power data from Texas, controlling for the gas price, nuclear generation and sea-
sonal eects. Jonsson et al. (2010) analyse hourly Danish electricity data in a
non-parametric regression model, assessing the eects of wind power forecasts on
the average electricity price and its distributional properties in western Denmark.
Both studies conclude that wind power in-feed has a signicant eect on the level
and volatility of the electricity price. The present analysis builds on these ndings
but takes a dierent methodological approach. It explicitly models the inuence
of intermittent renewable electricity generation on the price level and volatility in
Germany by using a GARCH model. The aim is to track the development of both
components over time and discover whether a regulatory change in the German
electricity market had an impact on the relationship between wind power in-feed
and the wholesale price.
3.3 Data
This chapter introduces daily data for wind electricity generation in the mean and
variance equation of a GARCH model to better explain the unsteady behaviour of
the electricity price. Figure 3.3 illustrates the negative correlation of daily wind in-
feed and the spot electricity price. Whenever high wind speeds allow above-average
electricity generation, one can observe a price dip. An in-depth study will reveal
more insights into this relationship as well as the development of price volatility.
In the following analysis, I use the day-ahead spot electricity price, Phelix Day
Base, from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) as dependent variable.6 Electric-
ity is traded on the day-ahead spot market for physical delivery on the next day.
Separate contracts for every hour of the next day are available. Prices and volumes
for all 24 contracts are determined in a single auction at noon. The Phelix Day
Base is then calculated as the average, weighted price over these hourly contracts.
Generally, the German electricity wholesale market is dominated by over-the-counter
6The time series is downloaded from Datastream.
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Figure 3.3: Forecasted wind in-feed and day-ahead electricity price
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Note: Daily wind electricity generation in MWh per day (blue line) and spot electricity price Phelix
Day Base (red line). Source: European Energy Exchange (EEX).
trading, and the contracts are mostly of a long-term nature (Bundesnetzagentur,
2010). However, trading volumes on the spot market are increasing and the Phelix
is an important benchmark for all other electricity market transactions (Nicolosi,
2010; Monopolkommission, 2011).7
Figure 3.4: Electricity price development
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Source: Datastream and EEX.
7The volume on the EEX spot market increased from 203 TWh in 2009 to 279 TWh in 2010. For
comparison, the German gross electricity production was 628 TWh in 2010 (AG Energiebilanzen,
2011). Electricity is also traded on the intraday market, but this market is less liquid and mainly
used to address electricity market imbalances in the short-run.
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The development of the electricity price, Phelix Day Base, is illustrated in
Figure 3.4. This study covers the period from January 2006 to January 2012. As
illustrated in Figure 3.1, the wind installation already exceeded 20 GW during this
period and played an important role in the German electricity mix. Table 3.1 reports
extreme kurtosis and skewness for the electricity price which can either arise from
extreme values or autocorrelation (Bierbrauer et al., 2007). Therefore, outliers are
detected before conducting the empirical analysis. In line with the literature, I lter
values that exceed three times the standard deviation of the original price series
(Mugele et al., 2005; Gianfreda, 2010).8 The outliers are replaced with the value of
three times the standard deviation for the respective weekday.9
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Original Price 48.06 46.07 301.54 -35.57 18.80 2.31 22.94
Deseasonalized 48.06 45.80 114.52 1.96 15.18 0.85 4.11
Log Deseasonalized 3.82 3.82 4.74 0.67 0.32 -0.70 8.09
Figure 3.5: Electricity price variation within the week
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Note: Average electricity price on dierent weekdays over the sample period.
8The standard deviation is calculated individually for all seven weekdays to compare like with
like. For example, a Monday is compared with the mean and the standard deviation of all Mondays
in the sample (Bierbrauer et al., 2007).
9The outlier detection is repeated after the rst round of outliers have been replaced, but no
additional outliers are found. In an alternative run, the median is used to replace outliers. This
does not lead to signicant dierences in the regression results.
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After smoothing outliers, the seasonal cycle is removed from the time series.
Given that pt=yt+st, the observed price pt comprises a stochastic part yt and a
seasonal component st. Figure 3.5 shows that the average electricity price varies
across the week because of changes in the electricity demand. Similarly, the price
follows a yearly pattern as the dierent seasons inuence the energy demand. Weekly
and yearly seasonality is addressed by using constant step functions which consist of
dummies for each seasonal cycle (Truck and Weron, 2004). Dummies for week days
di and months mj are included in the following function to capture seasonality:
10
(3.1) st = c+
7X
i=1
idi +
12X
j=1
mj:
The results for the deseasonalisation are shown in Table 3.2. The coecients for
weekday dummies in Table 3.2 follow the same pattern as shown in Figure 3.5: the
price remains high at the beginning of the week, declines from Friday onward, and
reaches its minimum on Sundays. The dummies for months are not all signicant,
but a relevant electricity price reduction is observed in March, April, May, and
August. In October and November, the price is signicantly higher than in January.
Finally, the seasonal component is deducted from the original price series, and the
mean of both series is aligned.
Finally, the logarithmic electricity price is calculated and employed in the fol-
lowing analysis.11 Figure 3.6 illustrates the original and the deseasonalised electricity
price series. The descriptive statistics of both series can be found in Table 3.1.
The main explanatory variable is the wind electricity generation in Germany.
An illustration how the in-feed of variable renewable electricity aects the existing
power system can be found in Annex B, Figure B.1. To match the day-ahead horizon
of the dependent variable, I use the predictions for daily wind power generation.
These short-term forecasts are accurate and, more importantly, reect the infor-
10Seasonal eects could also be addressed by trigonometric components (Lucia and Schwartz,
2002; Bierbrauer et al., 2007). However, such sinusoidal trends cannot be detected in the German
electricity data from 2006 to 2012.
11Estimating the logarithmic price series has the advantage that the coecients have a straight
forward interpretation. The augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic is -3.57274 whereas the 1%
critical value is -3.4331. The null hypothesis of a unit root is therefore rejected. The same holds
for the Phillips-Perron test, employed by Knittel and Roberts (2005), with a test statistic of
-17.37986 and a 1% critical value of -3.4330. Hence, it is not necessary to estimate the dierences
or returns.
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Figure 3.6: Deseasonalised electricity price
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Note: The upper panel shows the wholesale electricity price after outliers have been ltered and
seasonal trends removed. The lower panel shows the log level of this series.
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Table 3.2: Removing seasonality
Coecient p-value
c 51.89 (<0.0001)
Tue 2.76 (0.0226)
Wed 2.59 (0.0321)
Thu 2.04 (0.0912)
Fri -0.85 (0.4784)
Sat -9.47 (<0.0001)
Sun -17.49 (<0.0001)
Feb 1.07 (0.4934)
Mar -3.80 (0.0126)
Apr -4.54 (0.0032)
May -6.90 (<0.0001)
Jun -2.82 (0.0670)
Jul -0.56 (0.7100)
Aug -5.66 (0.0002)
Sep 2.00 (0.1913)
Oct 6.27 (<0.0001)
Nov 3.73 (0.0152)
Dec -2.39 (0.1170)
Note: OLS regression with the Phelix Day Base, corrected for outliers, as dependent variable.
Monday and January are used as reference variables. p-values in parentheses.
mation available to participants in the day-ahead market. The forecasts are made
and published by the four German transmission system operators (TSO). The TSOs
then sell the predicted amount of renewable electricity on the day-ahead electricity
market.12 The wind volumes are normally placed as price-independent bids to assure
that they are certainly sold in the day-ahead auction. When the price falls below
-150e in the daily auction, the energy exchange calls a second auction, in which
the wind volumes can be auctioned with a price limit between -350e and -150e
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). This rule was rst introduced by the regulator in 2010
and revised in 2011 to avoid extreme negative prices as experienced during 2009.
It was only necessary once, on 5. January 2012, to call a second auction.13 The
daily schedule of forecasting and selling wind is schematically illustrated in Figure
3.7. The TSOs should have no incentive to systematically mispredict the expected
renewable electricity generation: if the TSOs sell too much or too little renewable
12The data can be downloaded from the homepages of Tennet, Amprion, EnBW and 50Hertz.
For a shorter period they are also available from www.eeg-kwk.de and the EEX Transparency
Platform, www.transparency.eex.com. The data are available in hourly and 15-minute format. For
this study, 15-minute MW data are averaged for each hour and then summarised to MWh per day.
13Personal communication with Thomas Drescher, Head of Market Operations EPEX Leipzig,
in May 2012.
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electricity on the day-ahead market, they have to balance it on the intraday market
the following day (von Roon, 2011). The wind electricity generation depends on the
weather development and installed capacity but is independent from the electricity
price.14
Figure 3.7: Stylised scheduling in the day-ahead electricity market
8am 10.30am 12 12.05pm 12.25pm
*Second?auction?when?price?<??150?Euro
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ahead?market*
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day?ahead?
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Note: ATC stands for Available Transfer Capacity, EMCC for European Market Coupling
Company. Information regarding the daily operations is obtained from www.marketcoupling.de
and www.epexspot.com.
Of course, electricity price is not solely determined by wind electricity gen-
eration. Several papers indicate that the total electricity load, which reects the
demand prole, plays an important role in price behaviour. In fact, research shows
that the combination of both factors is particularly important in this regard. Jonsson
et al. (2010) show that the ratio between wind and conventional power production
aects the electricity price most. They use the ratio between wind and load which
is termed wind penetration. Similarly, Nicolosi and Fursch (2009) nd that the
residual load, the electricity demand that needs to be met by conventional power, is
a crucial parameter. The share of wind shows how much wind power contributes to
meeting total electricity demand and illustrates its relative importance. The same
amount of wind electricity will have a dierent impact on the price during a phase
of high electricity demand than it will during low demand. Load data which reect
14How much renewable capacity is installed depends greatly on subsidies, namely, the German
feed-in tari (FIT) system. The FIT does not inuence the wholesale electricity price traded on
the energy exchange, but it inuences the end-use price because the FIT costs are socialised among
almost all electricity users.
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the demand for electricity should be used in the estimations in order to put the wind
data into context.15
ENTSO-E, the association of European transmission operators, publishes data
on the vertical load and the total load in Germany. The vertical load reects the
net ows from the transmission to the distribution grid and therefore only a fraction
of total electricity demand.16 Therefore, a better proxy for the demand prole on a
given day is the total load which also includes electricity from small and renewable
sources in the distribution grid (ENTSO-E, 2012).17 ENTSO-E does not yet provide
forecasts for the total load. In line with Jonsson et al. (2010), the predicted load is
constructed according to the following relationship:
(3.2) Lt = L^t + et;
where Lt is the actual load, L^t is the predicted load, and et  N(0; 2) a residual.
By adding noise to the actual load, a load forecast is simulated. The standard
deviation of the error is chosen, in line with Jonsson et al. (2010), as 2 per cent
of the average load in the sample. According to Jonsson et al. (2010) and Weber
(2010), this is consistent with the errors that modern forecasting models produce.18
The advantage of Jonsson et al.'s (2010) method is that the error of the simulated
load forecast and the wind forecast are independent. Otherwise, both errors would
be inuenced by the weather forecast.19 When the wind forecast is put in perspective
with electricity demand L^t, its relative importance for the power system becomes
clear. Figure 3.8 shows that the share of wind uctuates between 0 and 40 per cent.
The discussed explanatory variables, wind and load, will be included in an extended
GARCH model of the electricity price. The methodology is elaborated in the next
section.
15The demand for electricity should be independent from the variable wind in-feed and should
therefore be an appropriate variable choice to avoid endogeneity problems.
16As the wind electricity is fed into the distribution grid, it is not included in the vertical load
data. However, the vertical load data are most accurate as this can be measured directly by the
TSO.
17However, care should be taken with the quality of the total load data. TSOs can only estimate
the total load, as they do not directly observe all ows in subordinated distribution grids.
18ENTSO-E publishes forecasts and actual values for the vertical load for 2010 and 2011. The
error has a standard deviation of 1.1 per cent of the average load in this period. However, the
vertical load data are more accurate and easier to predict than the total load. Therefore, 2 per
cent seems a reasonable assumption.
19The load forecast is simulated several times to test whether the regression results depend on
the randomly generated noise process. This is not the case.
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Figure 3.8: Share of wind power generation
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Note: The share is calculated as MWh of wind in-feed per MWh electricity load per day. Source:
EEX and ENTSO-E.
3.4 Model
The liberalisation of power markets turned electricity into a tradable commodity and
engendered a great deal of interest in understanding and modelling its price perfor-
mance. Deng (2000), Huisman and Mahieu (2003), Lucia and Schwartz (2002), and
Knittel and Roberts (2005) pioneered this research area. These studies emphasise
that distinct features of the electricity price should be included in an empirical
price model. Electricity, for example, is not storable: supply and demand have to
be matched instantly to avoid temporary imbalances. This can lead to extreme
prices that usually revert quickly once supply and demand reconciled. Hence, mean
reversion is common in electricity markets and should be included in a price model
(Deng, 2000; Huisman and Mahieu, 2003). Another important characteristic of
electricity, reected in its price, is seasonality. Demand varies throughout the day
and during the week, as well as across the year. Therefore, models of electricity
price should incorporate seasonality, as exemplied by Knittel and Roberts (2005)
or Lucia and Schwartz (2002).
Given the pronounced volatility in the liberalised markets, conditional het-
eroscedasticity models lend themselves well to correctly explain price performance
(Higgs and Worthington, 2010). These so-called GARCH models date back to
Bollerslev (1986). As they appropriately capture the uctuation and clustering of
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volatility, GARCHmodels are a widely employed method in nancial and commodity
markets. Knittel and Roberts (2005) were among the rst to apply a GARCH model
to the electricity price. They use an asymmetric GARCH model to capture price
responses to positive and negative shocks and do indeed detect an inverse leverage
eect. Other GARCH applications that have a bearing on this study are Solibakke
(2002) and Mugele et al. (2005). Furthermore, Escribano et al. (2011) contribute
to the literature by combining jumps and GARCH to explicitly control for price
spikes. They show that taking into account mean reversion, seasonality, and jumps
improves the GARCH model.
To better understand the performance of the electricity price, market funda-
mentals should be reected in the calculations (Janczura and Weron, 2010). Mount
et al. (2006) and Karakatsani and Bunn (2010) emphasise that variables for demand
and reserve margins should be included to better understand price movements.
Huisman (2008) also recognises the need to enrich the price model with fundamentals
and uses temperature variables to detect changes in price behaviour. Similarly,
Hadsell and Marathe (2006) and Gianfreda (2010) estimate an asymmetric GARCH
model and include traded electricity volume in the variance equation. They nd that
the trading volume has an eect on price volatility, which is in line with ndings from
stock markets, see for example Bollerslev and Jubinski (1999) or Le and Zurbruegg
(2010). Hadsell (2007) and Petrella and Sapio (2010) touch on another decisive
factor for the electricity price and use a GARCH model to test whether changes in
market design have an eect on price volatility.
Using a GARCH model allows to explicitly test the eect of the wind power
generation on the mean and volatility of the electricity price in an integrated ap-
proach. Moreover, a GARCH model seems most appropriate to mimic the volatility
behaviour of the electricity price. Figure 3.6 illustrates that volatility clustering is
present which is typical in nancial markets. This feature hints at autocorrelation
in the data, which is emphasised by the Q-statistic for the squared and the absolute
returns (Zivot, 2009).20 Furthermore, Engle's (1982) test for autoregressive condi-
tional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals conrms that ARCH eects are
present.21
20From an auxiliary OLS regression with the log price, autoregression is detected in the squared
returns. This suggests the estimation of a GARCH model.
21The null hypothesis of no ARCH eects in the residuals is rejected with a highly signicant
test statistic of 54.720 (<0.0001) when including two signicant lags of 2.
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As electricity is not storable, the price tends to spike and then revert as soon as
the divergence of supply and demand is resolved (Bierbrauer et al., 2007; Escribano
et al., 2011). This mean reverting characteristic of the electricity price motivates
the specication of the GARCH mean equation. To capture mean reversion, the
electricity price can be described by an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (Vasicek, 1977),
dpt = (  pt)dt+ dwt:(3.3)
Here, pt is the electricity price and wt a standard Wiener process. After deviating
from the mean,    pt, the price is corrected back to its mean. The speed of the
reversion is given by . According to Bierbrauer et al. (2007), Equation 3.3 can
be rewritten for the deseasonalised log price in discrete time as Gaussian AR(1)
process: yt = c + yt 1 + t, where c =   ,  = 1    and   iidN(0; 2).22
Hence, the speed of the mean reversion can be calculated from the coecient for the
autoregressive parameter. Mean reversion models have often been employed in the
literature (Clewlow and Strickland, 2000; Lucia and Schwartz, 2002), but a plain
mean-reverting process is found to overestimate the variance and the mean reversion
driven by volatile periods (Huisman and Mahieu, 2003). Similar to Knittel and
Roberts (2005), this motivates the estimation of an AR-GARCH model, including
a mean reversion parameter, in the following specication:
yt = +
lX
i=1
iyt i + t(3.4)
ht = ! +
pX
i=1
i
2
t i +
qX
j=1
jht j;(3.5)
where yt is the log electricity price and ht is its conditional variance. t =
p
htzt
and zt  NID(0; 1). ! is the long-run variance. For the model to be stationary,
i + j < 1 and i; j > 0.
The daily data for wind generation, wt, are included in the mean and the
variance equation of this model. Given this extension, the specication for the
22For the deseasonalised log price, Equation 3.3 can be written in discrete time as 4yt = ( 
yt)4t+sigma4wt. Given 4yt = yt+1 yt, the formula becomes yt = +(1 )yt 1+t. Check
for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a more detailed description of the transformation from
continuous to discrete time.
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ARX-GARCHX model becomes:
yt = +
lX
i=1
iyt i +
mX
j=1
jwt j + t(3.6)
ht = ! +
qX
i=1
i
2
t i +
pX
j=1
jht j +
sX
k=1
kwt k:(3.7)
In the normal GARCH model, the coecients in the variance equation, including
the additional coecients for , should be positive to ensure that the variance is
always positive (Gallo and Pacini, 1998; Zivot, 2009). When a coecient in the
GARCH variance equation is negative, one can inspect the conditional variance and
check whether it is always positive. In case of a negative coecient, the variance
stability of the GARCH is linked to the specic sample.23 The problem with negative
coecients is resolved when estimating an EGARCH where the variance equation is
positive by construction (Nelson, 1991; Gallo and Pacini, 1998). The EGARCH is
an extension in which the additional term allows dierentiating between the eect
of negative and positive price shocks to the variance. This asymmetry component is
often referred to as the leverage eect.24 In an EGARCH representation, Equation
3.7 becomes:
(3.8) log(ht) = ! +
qX
i=1
ij t ip
ht i
j+
rX
l=1
i
t lp
ht l
+
pX
j=1
jht j +
sX
k=1
kwt k:
The empirical strategy of this paper is to rst estimate the GARCH model with
Equation 3.7 for the German day-ahead electricity price, extended by covariates
for the wind power forecast. All specications are rst estimated including one
AR(1) parameter as derived from the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. To capture serial
correlation present in the price series, I then include the number of autoregressive
lags which minimise the Bayesian information criterion (Escribano et al., 2011).
I will report both specications to show that the coecients vary only slightly.
Finally, the EGARCH is employed to investigate possible asymmetric inuences on
the variance and to double-check variance stability.
23As the aim of this study is not to forecast the price, checking that the actual conditional
variance is positive assures stability.
24If  6= 0, the impact is asymmetric. A positive coecient of  indicates that positive price
shocks have a larger impact on volatility than negative shocks. The contrary holds for a negative
. The EGARCH is covariance stationary when  < 1 (Zivot, 2009).
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The aim of this study is not only to investigate the impact of wind power
generation on the electricity price, but also the regulatory modication to wind
electricity marketing. The German regulator amended the rules applicable to mar-
keting of renewable electricity in the so-called Ausgleichsmechanismusverordnung
in January 2010. In line with Antoniou and Foster (1992), Holmes and Antoniou
(1995), Bomm (2003), and Hadsell (2007), a dummy variable is introduced to
capture this regulatory change. The dummy takes the value of 1 after the change.
This gives a rst impression as to whether change can be observed in the volatility of
the electricity price after the regulation was amended. However, the dummy imposes
a restriction regarding the expected change ex ante on the model. Therefore, the
inuence of the new regulatory design is double-checked by consulting structural
break tests. The OLS-Cusum and the Bai-Perron breakpoint test are employed
to nd structural changes in the conditional variance of the GARCH model. This
procedure seems more objective than the dummy variable approach as the results
are not driven by a prior assumption.
The OLS-Cusum test is a generalised uctuation test (Zeileis et al., 2001)
designed to discover whether a series changes over time. In an auxiliary regression,
a constant is tted to the GARCH volatility. An OLS-based empirical process
is derived from the cumulative sums of standardised residuals of this regression
(Ploberger and Kramer, 1992). For the OLS-Cusum, this empirical uctuation
process starts and ends in zero. A breakpoint is detected at the peak of the process
(Zeileis et al., 2003).25 This test is useful to uncover whether a series is characterised
by structural changes and to arrive at a rough impression as to when they occurred.
The so-called Bai-Perron breakpoint test goes into more detail and allows dating the
structural shifts (Bai and Perron, 2003). A least squares regression is partitioned
and the minimal residual sum of squares (rss) is calculated for each segment. The
rss for all segments are summarised. Breakpoints that minimise this sum over all
partitions are calculated. For more detail, see Bai and Perron (2003) or Zeileis et al.
(2003).
25As a robustness check, the F-test is also calculated (Andrews and Ploberger, 1994). The
conclusions for the OLS-Cusum test can be conrmed.
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3.5 Estimation Results
3.5.1 Impact of Wind Power
The results for the GARCH(1,1) estimations can be found in Table 3.3.26 All
standard errors are calculated using the Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) method
which assured that the test statistics are robust to non-normality of the residual.
The rst column (A) shows the GARCH benchmark specication for the log level of
the electricity price. All coecients are highly signicant, the variance parameters
are all positive, and their sum is smaller than one. The size of the GARCH term 
with 0.56 indicates that the autoregressive persistence  is not particularly strong
for the electricity price. The GARCH term  reects the impact of new shocks
the conditional variance ht, transmitted though the error term t from Equation 3.4.
The AR term depicts a specicity of the power market. The coecient of 0.88 in (A)
shows that the price reverts back to its long-run mean. But the speed of reversion,
given by 1  1, is low.
The Ljung-Box Q-statistic suggests that serial correlation is not well approx-
imated by a single autoregressive term. Therefore, a more dynamic specication is
estimated and further autoregressive parameters added. By minimising the Bayesian
information criterion, seven lags are included in the specication (A*) in Table 3.4.
The signicant seventh lag mirrors the weekly seasonal component and is in line
with Escribano et al. (2011). The GARCH coecients remain fairly stable with an
increase in  and, vice versa, a reduction of . Their sum, however, stays below 1.
This shows that the conditional variance is mean-reverting, and shocks only have a
temporary eect on ht (Hadsell, 2007).
27
In column (B) and (B*) the logarithms of wind and load are included in
the mean as well as the variance equation of the GARCH(1,1).28 The negative
coecient for the wind variable shows that the day-ahead price decreases when high
wind electricity generation is forecasted. This conrms ndings by Jonsson et al.
(2010) as well as Woo et al. (2011) and underlines the merit-order eect. In the
26The ARCH LM test conrms that the volatility clustering is well captured for all further
specications. Hence, no ARCH eects remain.
27The half-live of shocks can be calculated by ln(0.5)/ln(+), and the conditional variance
reverts back to its mean after 5.91 days (Zivot, 2009).
28Both variables added in logarithms to normalise the size and uctuation of the series.
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present specication (B) and (B*), the coecients can be interpreted as elasticities.
When the wind electricity in-feed (MWh per day) increases by 1 per cent, the price
decreases between 0.09 and 0.10 per cent. In the variance equation, the wind variable
is signicantly dierent from zero and positive. Hence, the uctuating wind in-feed
increases the volatility of the electricity price. To make sure that these results are
not driven by the outliers that remain in the log electricity price, an outlier dummy
is included in all mean equations.29 The coecient for the load variable is only
signicant in specication (B*) in Table 3.4, and illustrates that the price increases
with higher electricity demand. The variance, however, is reduced in times of high
demand, which might arise from higher liquidity of the electricity market.
A similar picture arises in column (C) and (C*) when the share of wind is
included in the GARCH model. The wind variable reects the share of wind relative
to total electricity load. The coecient for this wind penetration measure turns out
as expected: a strong wind in-feed lowers the electricity price but increases its
variance. When the share of wind rises by one percentage point, the electricity price
decreases by 1.32 or 1.46 per cent in specication (C) and (C*). The coecient is
higher than before because the wind variable is now expressed as a share of total load.
For the wind share to rise by one percentage point, the wind electricity production
needs to gain quite substantially.30 When the wind variables are added in (B) and
(C), respectively (B*) and (C*), the coecient for the GARCH term  increases
slightly, accompanied by a downward adjustment of . This suggests that a omitted
variable bias skewed their coecients in the previous specication (A*). Generally,
the t of the model, measured by the information criteria, improves when more
autoregressive parameters are included in specications (B) and (C), respectively
(B*) and (C*).
To arrive at a rst impression of how wind power's inuence on the electricity
price evolved over time, rolling regressions are calculated for specication (C).31
Figure 3.9 shows how the coecients evolve, using a three-year window. The rolling
29The dummy captures the 1.1.2007, 1.1.2008, 4.10.2009, and 25.12.2009. When AR terms are
included in the regression, the respective number of lagged dummies is included as well.
30This can be illustrated as follows. The mean wind forecast is 111 GWh per day, the mean load
reaches 1.332 GWh. The average share therefore is 8 per cent. To reach 9 per cent, wind has to
rise a substantial 13 MWh or 12 per cent.
31Rolling regressions with a 2 year window have been calculated as well and give a broadly similar
picture. However, a longer window is preferred for the coecients to be signicant. Moreover, the
picture for specication (B), including log levels for wind and load separately, looks very much the
same.
3.5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 79
T
ab
le
3.
3:
R
es
u
lt
s
A
R
(1
)-
G
A
R
C
H
(1
,1
)
m
o
d
el
s
w
it
h
ad
d
it
io
n
al
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
lo
g
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
p
ri
ce
S
a
m
p
le
:
1
/
1
/
2
0
0
6
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
2
(A
)
(B
)l
og
(W
in
d
)
(C
)W
in
d
/L
oa
d
(D
)W
in
d
/L
oa
d
lo
g(
L
oa
d
)
R
eg
u
la
ti
on
d
u
m
m
y
M
ea
n
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
C
on
st
an
t
3.
83
8
(<
0.
00
01
)
5.
35
1
(<
0.
00
01
)
3.
95
2
(<
0.
00
01
)
3.
93
4
(<
0.
00
01
)

1
0.
88
1
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
89
9
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
90
1
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
87
4
(<
0.
00
01
)
lo
g(
W
in
d
)
-0
.0
89
(<
0.
00
01
)
lo
g(
L
oa
d
)
-0
.0
35
(0
.1
94
5)
W
in
d
/L
oa
d
-1
.3
15
(<
0.
00
01
)
-1
.2
49
(<
0.
00
01
)
A
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
ou
tl
ie
rs
in
th
e
lo
g
pr
ic
e
an
d
it
s

rs
t
la
g
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
al
l
m
ea
n
eq
u
at
io
n
s.
V
ar
ia
n
ce
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
!
0.
00
7
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
32
4
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
00
3
(0
.0
07
6)
0.
01
1
(<
0.
00
01
)

1
0.
24
3
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
27
3
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
26
7
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
25
0
(<
0.
00
01
)

1
0.
55
7
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
54
1
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
55
5
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
30
0
(<
0.
00
01
)
lo
g(
W
in
d
)
0.
00
2
(0
.0
05
9)
lo
g(
L
oa
d
)
-0
.0
24
(<
0.
00
01
)
W
in
d
/L
oa
d
0.
03
1
(0
.0
15
5)
0.
05
2
(<
0.
00
01
)
R
eg
u
la
ti
on
d
u
m
m
y
-0
.0
10
(<
0.
00
01
)
A
d
j.
R
2
0.
68
6
0.
72
6
0.
73
9
0.
74
2
L
og
lik
el
ih
o
o
d
82
9.
29
1
10
83
.4
01
10
75
.0
98
11
50
.7
45
A
IC
-0
.7
41
-0
.9
66
-0
.9
61
-1
.0
28
B
IC
-0
.7
23
-0
.9
38
-0
.9
37
-1
.0
02
N
ot
e:
A
IC
st
an
ds
fo
r
A
ka
ik
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
it
er
io
n,
B
IC
fo
r
B
ay
es
ia
n
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
it
er
io
n.
p-
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
80 CHAPTER3: WIND POWER AND THE ELECTRICITY MARKET
T
ab
le
3.
4:
R
es
u
lt
s
A
R
(7
)-
G
A
R
C
H
(1
,1
)
m
o
d
el
s
w
it
h
ad
d
it
io
n
al
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
:
lo
g
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
p
ri
ce
S
a
m
p
le
:
1
/
1
/
2
0
0
6
1
/
3
1
/
2
0
1
2
(A
*)
(B
*)
lo
g(
W
in
d
)
(C
*)
W
in
d
/L
oa
d
(*
D
)W
in
d
/L
oa
d
lo
g(
L
oa
d
)
R
eg
u
la
ti
on
d
u
m
m
y
M
ea
n
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
C
on
st
an
t
3.
86
2
(<
0.
00
01
)
3.
86
2
(<
0.
00
01
)
4.
04
2
(<
0.
00
01
)
3.
97
0
(<
0.
00
01
)

1
0.
65
2
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
58
1
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
58
9
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
59
7
(<
0.
00
01
)

2
-0
.0
35
(0
.2
53
9)
-0
.0
05
(0
.8
66
8)
-0
.0
40
(0
.1
96
8)
-0
.0
10
(0
.7
23
8)

3
0.
09
6
(0
.0
01
0)
0.
08
3
(0
.0
03
6)
0.
09
7
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
06
0
(0
.0
31
3)

4
0.
00
8
(0
.7
70
7)
0.
02
9
(0
.3
34
3)
-0
.0
03
(0
.9
11
6)
-0
.0
09
(0
.7
28
3)

5
0.
03
6
(0
.2
19
9)
0.
02
4
(0
.4
52
2)
0.
02
8
(0
.3
48
3)
0.
04
9
(0
.1
74
4)

6
0.
10
4
(0
.0
01
0)
0.
11
3
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
13
0
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
12
1
(<
0.
00
01
)

7
0.
09
3
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
13
6
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
16
5
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
14
9
(<
0.
00
01
)
lo
g(
W
in
d
)
-0
.0
98
(<
0.
00
01
)
lo
g(
L
oa
d
)
0.
08
1
(0
.0
18
5)
W
in
d
/L
oa
d
-1
.4
89
(<
0.
00
01
)
-1
.4
14
(<
0.
00
01
)
A
d
u
m
m
y
fo
r
ou
tl
ie
rs
in
th
e
lo
g
pr
ic
e
an
d
se
ve
n
la
gs
ar
e
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
al
l
m
ea
n
eq
u
at
io
n
s.
V
ar
ia
n
ce
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
!
0.
00
3
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
28
1
(0
.0
00
4)
0.
00
2
(0
.0
31
0)
0.
00
9
(<
0.
00
01
)

1
0.
16
4
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
25
0
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
22
7
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
25
3
(<
0.
00
01
)

1
0.
72
5
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
56
3
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
63
8
(<
0.
00
01
)
0.
31
3
(<
0.
00
01
)
lo
g(
W
in
d
)
0.
00
2
(0
.0
47
0)
lo
g(
L
oa
d
)
-0
.0
21
(0
.0
00
3)
W
in
d
/L
oa
d
0.
02
0
(0
.0
63
1)
0.
04
5
(<
0.
00
01
)
R
eg
u
la
ti
on
d
u
m
m
y
-0
.0
08
(<
0.
00
01
)
A
d
j.
R
2
0.
72
0
0.
77
2
0.
78
4
0.
78
3
L
og
lik
el
ih
o
o
d
94
8.
59
8
12
53
.4
31
12
64
.9
87
13
33
.3
51
A
IC
-0
.8
42
-1
.1
15
-1
.1
27
-1
.1
88
B
IC
-0
.7
92
-1
.0
55
-1
.0
72
-1
.1
31
N
ot
e:
A
n
as
te
ri
sk
*
la
be
ls
th
e
sp
ec
i
ca
ti
on
s
th
at
in
cl
ud
e
se
ve
n
au
to
re
gr
es
si
ve
la
gs
of
th
e
pr
ic
e.
A
IC
st
an
ds
fo
r
A
ka
ik
e
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
it
er
io
n,
B
IC
fo
r
B
ay
es
ia
n
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
cr
it
er
io
n.
p-
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
3.5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 81
Figure 3.9: Rolling regressions for specication (C) with a three year window
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Note: The regressions have been estimated for a moving window of three years. The rst window
starts on 1.1.2006 and ends on 31.12.2008. The dates in the legend indicate the end of each three-
year window. The lines show the development of the coecients for each consecutive regression.
regressions illustrate, on the one hand, that the wind coecient from the variance
equation remains fairly constant. On the other hand, the coecient for the wind
share in the mean equation, depicted by the orange line, becomes less negative over
time. The wind in-feed can no longer decrease the price level as much. Stated
dierently, the merit-order eect lessens over time. Sensfu (2011) nd the same
eect for Germany. A plausible explanation for the weaker merit-order eect is the
increasing share of solar PV in-feed. Already, a merit-order eect from wind power
can be observed for solar PV in Germany (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). As Figure
3.10 shows, electricity generation from solar PV depresses mainly peak power prices.
Lower peak power prices reduce the daily average wholesale price used in this study.
When the average price is lower on days with little wind, the calculated merit-order
eect for wind will be smaller. This also explains the dip during winter 2010 when
solar PV was not able to lower peak prices. Investigating this interaction in an
analysis with hourly prices would be interesting but is left for further research.
Another reason for the weakening merit-order eect could be the stronger electivity
trade within Europe. The possibility to export excess wind electricity generation
smoothes the price development (Hulle, 2009). This eect is further explained at
the end of this section.
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Figure 3.10: Solar PV in-feed and peak prices
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After April 2011, the impact of wind on the electricity price diminishes even
further. This is most likely related to the nuclear phase-out in Germany. Shutting
down nuclear power plants shifts the merit-order curve as illustrated by Figure 3.11.
The price decrease, induced by wind, is less strong when the nuclear capacity is
removed. This results are conrmed by ndings of Thoenes (2011).
3.5.2 Impact of Regulatory Change
The empirical framework is used to evaluate modications to the power market
design and the renewables regulation. The German regulator amended the mar-
keting of renewable electricity in the so-called Ausgleichsmechanismusverordnung
in January 2010. All TSOs are now required to forecast the renewable power
production one day in advance and to sell the total predicted amount on the
day-ahead market. TSOs then receive the revenues from selling the renewable power
volumes at the wholesale market price (see Figure 3.12). However, these funds
are most likely insucient to remunerate the producers of renewable electricity
according to the feed-in tari rates. Therefore, TSOs also receive the so-called
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Figure 3.11: Stylised merit-order curve before and after the nuclear phase-out
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Note: Simplied merit order curve in line with von Roon and Huck (2010) and Gruet (2011). The
blue line illustrates marginal costs for electricity from wind, yellow stands for nuclear, brown for
lignite, black for hard coal, orange for gas, and purple for oil. The dotted line illustrates the case
without nuclear.
EEG levy which is after all raised from the electricity users.32 The EEG levy
covers payments for feed-in taris as well as costs from forecasting, balancing, and
marketing of renewable electricity.
The previous marketing mechanism was more complicated. TSOs had to pre-
dict the renewable electricity production a month in advance. These forecasts were
quite inaccurate as the wind and solar PV power production is highly dependent on
meteorological factors.33 Energy suppliers and TSOs then agreed on a xed schedule
for renewable electricity delivery on each day of the following month (Buchmuller
and Schnutenhaus, 2009). These volumes had to be physically delivered from a TSO
to the energy supplier (see Annex B, Figure B.2 for an illustration). As the nal
wind in-feed was uncertain, the physical delivery of renewable electricity via the
TSOs to the energy companies was an inecient mechanism (Monopolkommission,
2009). When wind power generation was lower than expected, the missing electricity
volumes had to be bought by the TSOs on the day-ahead or intrady market. A
surplus of renewable electricity, on the contrary, had to be sold on the market
32EEG stands for Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz. The EEG levy is payed by the energy suppliers
who then pass the costs to consumers and industry. Some electricity users are exempt from the
levy.
33Other renewable electricity generation, for example biomass, is less problematic in this respect.
84 CHAPTER3: WIND POWER AND THE ELECTRICITY MARKET
Figure 3.12: Marketing mechanism after the regulatory change in 2010
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Note: Illustration adapted from Buchmuller and Schnutenhaus (2009). Blue arrows show the ows
of renewable electricity from the installations to the nal electricity users. Orange arrows indicate
monetary ows that nally remunerate the operators of renewable electricity installations. More
detailed information is available at: www.bundesnetzagentur.de
(Erdmann, 2008). More sudden shortfalls had to be xed on the balancing market.
This mechanism led to substantial balancing costs for adjustments in the spot
markets. In 2008, they reached 595 million Euro for all TSOs (Bundesnetzagentur,
2012). With the new regulation, the forecasting uncertainty and interventions on the
spot markets could be reduced. The related costs shrank substantially to 127 Mio
in 2010, and the electricity users were disburdened (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012).34
Under the old regulation, the expenses for spot and balancing market interventions
were hidden in the network charge (Buchmuller and Schnutenhaus, 2009). Since
2010, these costs are added to the EEG levy. This increases the transparency for
electricity users who get a clearer picture of the renewable subsidy and system costs.
Transparency also increases with regard to the marketed renewable energy
volumes as they have to be sold on the day-ahead market. The additional wind
volumes increase liquidity of the day-ahead and the intraday market signicantly
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). This is expected to reduce price volatility as smoother
prices can generally be observed in a more liquid market (Figlewski, 1981; Weber,
34The overall EEG levy still continues to rise due to high liabilities from feed-in tari payments,
just the burden from the balancing costs is reduced.
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2010). Moreover, TSOs had no incentive under the old regulation to optimise
activities on the day-ahead and the intraday market because they could socialise
these expenses via the network charge (UoSC) to electricity users (Buchmuller
and Schnutenhaus, 2009). According to Klessmann et al. (2008), integration of
renewable electricity in Germany was opaque and inecient before 2010. Under
the new regulation, the interventions on the day-ahead market become obsolete and
related disturbances are expected to reduce.
To test for the eect of the regulatory change on the price volatility, a dummy
variable is included in the variance regression. This procedure follows Antoniou and
Foster (1992), Holmes and Antoniou (1995), Bomm (2003), and Hadsell (2007).
The dummy variable captures the eect on the variance after the regulatory change
in 1. January 2010. The dummy is not included in the mean equation as the new
regulatory design only alters the way renewable electricity volumes are absorbed
from the market. The overall electricity supply { whether it be generated from
renewable or conventional power plants { remains unaected by the regulation.
Therefore, the price level should not be aected from the regulatory change, and
the focus lies on the price variance.35
The results from specication (D) and (D*) can be found in Table 3.3 and Table
3.4. In both cases, the negative and signicant coecient for the dummy variable
indicates a reduction of the conditional variance after the regulatory change. The
eects of wind and load, discussed earlier, remain robust. Despite the negative
coecient for the dummy, the conditional variance does not become negative for
the given sample. Therefore, the specication remains valid. The ndings are still
cross-checked in an EGARCH (1,1) which yields a stable variance even with negative
coecient in the variance equation. The results can be found in Table 3.5. The eect
of the wind share as well as the negative coecient for the regulatory dummy remain
unchanged. The leverage parameter in specication (E1) and (E1*) is insignicant,
and asymmetry seems not to be present.
Dening a dummy imposes assumptions regarding the structural shift. A more
objective approach is to use a pure time series approach that detects irregularities in
the variance from investigating the data. Following Chevallier (2011b), changes in
the conditional variance are evaluated using various break tests. The OLS-Cusum
35This assumption was double-checked by adding the dummy variable to the mean equation. It
stays insignicant and the results for the variance equation are not aected.
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Figure 3.13: Structural break tests for specication (C) and (C*)
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test is performed for the conditional variance from (C) and the more dynamic
specication (C*). The upper panel of Figure 3.13 shows the empirical uctuation
process for the OLS-Cusum test together with the boundaries at the 5 per cent
signicance level. If the cumulative sum of squares stays within the boundaries, the
residual variance is relatively stable. If it crosses the lines, the uctuation is too
large, and the null hypothesis of no structural change is rejected. The instability is
depicted by two main peaks that indicate structural shifts in January 2008 and in
January 2010. The next step is to date the volatility shifts in more detail. As shown
in the lower panels of Figure 3.13, the Bai-Perron break test nds four breakpoints
where the BIC is minimised.36 The breaks in the conditional variance are identied
on 25.12.2006, 8.1.2008, 22.12.2008, and 13.1.2010. It is not surprising that multiple
irregularities are depicted in the volatility structure, given the rather unsteady
electricity market. The breakpoint test conrms the structural shifts shown in the
OLS-Cusum test. The conditional variance seems to undergo a change in early
January 2008 and 2010. This conrms the previous regression results and connotes
that the break in early January 2010 relates to the amendment of the marketing of
renewable electricity. As a robustness check, the same test strategy is applied to
specication (B) and (B*). These results can be found in Annex B, Figure B.3.
3.5.3 Impact of Market Coupling
The German market is not isolated, and electricity ows to neighbouring countries
are important, especially for the integration of intermittent renewable electricity. A
good example is the wind power from northern Germany which can often not be
transmitted to the southern parts of the country due to capacity constraints in grid.
High wind energy generation results in exports to neighbour countries, although the
electricity could be used in southern Germany. To make sure that the reduction
in the variance from 2010 onwards is not simply a result of the better integrated
electricity market, I control for cross-border trade in the European electricity market.
The integration of the European electricity market has gained considerable
importance from the creation of the European Market Coupling Company (EMCC).
Since November 2009, Germany and Denmark pursuit day-ahead volume coupling
36Bai and Perron (2003) argue that the Bayesian information criterion is the best measure to
determine the number of breaks.
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on the two interconnectors between Germany and Denmark. In May 2010, the
Baltic cable between Germany and Sweden joined. On 10. November 2010, the
countries of the CWE region (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) and the so-called Northern region (Denmark, Sweden and Norway)
coupled their electricity markets.37 The electricity ows of these countries are now
jointly optimised, and electricity is exported from low-price to high-price areas, as
a matter of eciency. The necessary congestion management is carried out by the
EMCC in a so-called interim tight volume coupling (Monopolkommission, 2009).38
For this study, I use the interconnector capacities that can be used to export excess
wind production.39 The capacities are reported to the EMCC before the price setting
on the day-ahead market and are therefore exogenous from the dependent variable.40
For reasons of data availability, I use data for the interconnectors between Germany
and the Northern region only (Baltic Cable, DK West and DK East).
The \north-bound" interconnector capacity is included in specication (E2)
and (E2*) in Table 3.5. The coecient of the EMCC capacity is positive in the
mean equation. With a better connected power market, electricity ows are jointly
optimised, and exports ow from low-price areas to countries where demand and
price are higher. When the electricity price is low in Germany, more export capacity
can stabilise the German price. A higher interconnector capacity also decreases the
conditional variance as a better integrated electricity market is more exible, and
shocks are more easily absorbed. Finally, the conclusions regarding the regulatory
change and the wind in-feed remain valid. Therefore, previous specications that
omit the interconnector capacity seem not to be misspecied.
37CWE stands for Central Western Europe. Countries connected in the CWE and the Nordic
region account for approximately 55% of the European electricity generation (Bottcher, 2011).
38The TSOs from the participating countries report the interconnector capacities one day in
advance to the EMCC (see Figure 3.7). In addition, the EMCC receives the anonymised order
books from the participating electricity exchanges after the day-ahead spot market closed at 12am.
The buying and selling orders, including the volumes of renewable electricity and the interconnector
capacity, are optimised by the EMCC. The algorithm determines the price-independent volumes
that have to be sold additionally on those markets that had too high prices. The EMCC only
calculates the additional electricity quantities that are needed to equalise the price amongst
participating countries. The auctioning and price setting remains in the hands of the local
exchanges (Bottcher, 2011).
39The so-called Available Transfer Capacity (ATC) is included in the regressions. ATC is the
physical interconnector capacity which is not yet allocated and is free to use. This export potential
reects the technical and physical restrictions in the neighbour country.
40The electricity trade ows are an outcome variable as they are determined together with the
price on the day-ahead markets. The data on the electricity trade are therefore not included in
this study.
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3.6 Policy Implications
This chapter shows that intermittent renewable generation already transmits volatil-
ity to the electricity price. The question is how to integrate electricity from variable
sources more smoothly.
First, better geographical integration is important. Building renewable instal-
lations throughout Germany would even out the regional uctuation and assure that
wind and sunshine are captured at dierent sites (Klinge Jacobsen and Zvingilaite,
2010). However, optimal sites for renewable installations are limited within one
country. It seems more ecient to connect renewable installations throughout
Europe. Schaber et al. (2012) project that improved interconnection within Europe
will reduce market eects of variable renewable electricity substantially. Hulle
(2009) also emphasise that grid extensions lead to steadier wind generation levels.
Better grid connection can be fostered by new cables but also by using existing
capacity more eciently. Experience in Europe has shown that modifying the
market coupling regime is helpful in this regard (Hulle, 2009; Monopolkommission,
2011). The presented results, regarding the EMCC market coupling, link in with
these conclusions.
Second, exible conventional power plants as well as electricity storage help
balancing uctuations of renewable energy. In times of high renewables in-feed,
storage can collect and save excess electricity. Flexible generation units are power
plants with low ramping costs, for example gas turbines. These plants operate
at high variable but low xed costs and can therefore be switched on and o to
equalise low renewable power in-feed. The main diculty of both options, storage
and exible generation capacity, is their investment cost. Providing responsive
generation capacity needs to be protable. With more and more renewables in the
power system, conventional plants will mainly balance renewable uctuation and
therefore operate fewer full-load hours. Recovering the investment costs for exible
conventional units during these load hours will become more dicult (Klessmann
et al., 2008; Klinge Jacobsen and Zvingilaite, 2010; Steggals et al., 2011). Peri-
ods with peak prices, which allow plant operators to generate revenues, become
less certain and predictable due to the high variability of renewable electricity
generation. The increased renancing risk questions the viability of investments
in exible conventional capacity, and the market mechanisms might fail to give
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suciently strong investment signals. The literature discusses various policy options,
such as capacity markets, capacity payments, or reliability options, to support the
construction and availability of exible capacity. All these policy models are subject
of some controversial debate (Cramton and Ockenfels, 2011). It is not clear that
introducing such new policy instruments is benecial and necessary. For the time
being, ifo and FfE (2012) rather suggest using the existing structure of the balancing
market to auction more long-term capacity.
Finally, this study emphasises that regulatory changes can encourage a better
integration of intermittent renewable electricity in the power system. Going for-
ward, the regulatory and the policy framework should be further adjusted to the
challenges arising from the decarbonisation of the electricity market. Regarding
the regulatory setting, on the one hand, intermittent renewables could be better
integrated if gate closure on day-ahead and intraday markets would be later (Hiroux
and Saguan, 2010). A later gate closure would reduce uncertainty on the spot
markets and balancing costs because a shorter forecasting horizon makes actual wind
generation more predictable.41 Another small step towards a better integration of
renewables is to oer dierent products on the spot markets. Since December 2011,
the German intraday market oers not only hourly, but 15 minute electricity blocks
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). Given the stochastic generation prole of wind and
solar PV, this product increases exibility for market participants. Such smaller
products should probably be introduced to the day-ahead market as well. With
respect to the policy framework, on the other hand, renewable support schemes
should be revisited. Currently, renewable energy is not exposed to any market
risk in Germany due to guaranteed feed-in taris. A more market-based system
would give incentives to realign renewable electricity supply with demand. Support
schemes that depend on the wholesale electricity price make generation most at-
tractive during peak load. Germany already oers renewable electricity producers to
choose between xed feed-in taris and price-dependent feed-in premiums. Since the
beginning of 2012, renewable electricity producers are given a third option: they can
sell their renewable electricity directly on the market without using TSO services.
They forego the feed-in tari but currently receive a similar payment to make this
option attractive. This so-called Direktvermarktung does not yet reduce subsidy
41The implementation may not be straight forward as all action needs to be coordinated among
European states.
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payments but creates another market-based channel to integrate renewable power.
Together with a transition to feed-in premiums, this approach should be rigorously
pursued. Simultaneously, balancing costs should be partly shifted to the operators
of renewable installations. In Germany, these integration costs are currently passed
on to energy users, in other countries, for example Spain or the UK, the operator
of renewable installations has to bear these costs partly (Klessmann et al., 2008).
When exposing renewables to more market risk, the maturity of the technology and
the functionality of the market need to be taken into account. Surely, intermittent
installations have a limited ability to respond to price signals and should not be
exposed to full risk (Klessmann et al., 2008). But renewable electricity generation
now plays an important role in the German power system and should therefore
assume more responsibility. A completely protected environment can hardly be
sustained when planning to increase the renewables share to 35 per cent of gross
electricity production in 2020. Market-based support could give positive long-run
incentives to exploit portfolio eects, to choose optimal installation sites, and to
improve the generation forecasts (Hiroux and Saguan, 2010).
3.7 Conclusions
With the aim of reducing carbon emissions and increasing energy security, renewable
electricity generation is strongly supported by politicians and interest groups. This
has led, especially during the last decade, to a rapid increase of renewable electricity
generation in many parts of the world. In Germany, renewables now make up 20
per cent of the country's gross electricity production. The share of intermittent
electricity generation from wind and solar PV has grown particularly quickly. Large
amounts of stochastic wind electricity pose new challenges for the power system.
Assuring a stable electricity supply and price becomes increasingly dicult. Given
that Germany strives for an electricity mix with 35 per cent renewables in 2020
and 50 per cent in 2030, resilient integration of intermittent renewable electricity
becomes absolutely crucial.
The presented results show that intermittent wind power generation does not
only decrease the wholesale electricity price in Germany but also increases its volatil-
ity. This conclusion holds across various specications underlining the robustness
of the results. The disruptive eect of variable renewables on the wholesale price
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is relevant for the entire energy system. A lower and more volatile electricity price
probably provides insucient incentives to investment in new generation capacity,
both in renewable as well as conventional capacity. The higher price volatility
introduces uncertainty which, according to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), might lead to a
delay of investments. After all, exible generation plants become more important to
back-up an increasing share of intermittent renewable electricity, but more dicult
to nance. It is of the utmost importance that the electricity price continues to
induce investments { in carbon-free renewables capacity and in back-up capacity
needed to maintain security of supply.
This study nds evidence that a more reliable price signal can be achieved.
The volatility of the German electricity price decreased after a regulatory change
in 2010. Hence, the market design can to some extent smoothen the volatility of
the electricity price and stabilise its level. Going from here, renewable electricity
regulation should be developed further, towards a more market-orientated structure
that remunerates renewable electricity during phases of high electricity prices. In
Germany, the transformation of the energy system brings along many challenges.
A framework that sets appropriate incentives for new investments and stabilises
the wholesale price is prerequisite to meet these requirements. An ecient and
more market-based integration of variable renewable electricity would unburden the
consumers who currently pay most of the energy transition. This, in turn, could
strengthen public support for the necessary transformations.
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Appendix A
Annex for Chapter 2
List of Selected Policy Events
Table A.1: EU ETS NAPs
Date Event
16.01.2007 NAP Belgium, Netherlands
05.02.2007 NAP Slovenia
26.03.2007 NAP Czech Republic, France, Poland
02.04.2007 NAP Austria
16.04.2007 NAP Hungary
04.05.2007 NAP Estonia
15.05.2007 NAP Italy
25.05.2007 Poland and Czech Republic plan to sue EU over NAPs1
04.06.2007 NAP Finland
13.07.2007 NAP Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden
31.07.2007 Latvia does not accept EU cap2
31.08.2007 NAP Danmark
22.10.2007 NAP Portugal
26.10.2007 NAP Bulgaria, Romania
07.12.2007 NAP Slovakia
23.09.2009 Court decision on Polish NAP3
1www.euractiv.com (Article 164066).
2www.euractiv.com (Article165990).
3www.euractiv.com (Article 185715).
Source: www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allocation/2008.
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Table A.2: Global Carbon Market
Date Event Source
19.06.2007 German Bundestag decides on 22% CER use in EU ETS Unicredit
06.08.2008 Link ITL und CITL announced Unicredit
09.01.2009 Russia is expelled from international trade Unicredit
28.01.2009 Commission's proposal for a global pact in Copenhagen EC1
20.07.2009 Czech, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine sell AAUs Unicredit
15.09.2009 CDM validator SGS is suspended Unicredit
18.12.2009 COP Copenhagen 07.12.09-18.12.09 Unicredit
21.01.2010 IPCC mistakes Unicredit
29.03.2010 Validator TUV and Cemco suspended Unicredit
12.03.2010 Recycled CERs Unicredit
23.06.2010 Discussion on HFC projects in the CDM EB Unicredit
26.08.2010 Discussion on HFC projects reaches EU ETS Unicredit
1EC, Climate change: Commission sets out proposals for global pact on climate
change at Copenhagen, Press Release IP/09/141, 28.01.2009.
Table A.3: EU ETS III
Date Event Source
10.01.2007 EC invites members to 'unilaterally' reduce GHG by 20% in 2020 Unicredit
12.09.2007 Strong divergences regarding the plan to cap GHG from aviation Euractiv1
23.01.2008 European Climate Change Package EC2
07.10.2008 EP environment committee votes in favour of 3 reports on climate change policies3
11.02.2009 EC publishes preliminary list of aviation operators included in the EU ETS EA4
23.04.2009 Revised EU ETS Directive 2009/29/EC EC5
08.06.2009 Detailed interpretation of the aviation activities EC6
28.01.2010 Registries closed due to phishing Unicredit
03.05.2010 Brussels discusses a 30% CO2 reduction target Euractiv7
09.07.2010 Cap rst step: number of EUAs to be issued for 2013 EC8
14.07.2010 CC Committee agrees on auctioning Unicredit
21.09.2010 Debate on aviation activities in the EU ETS EC9
22.10.2010 Cap second step and publication of benchmark study EC10
1 www.euractiv.com (Article 166690).
2 www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0016:FIN:en:PDF.
3 www.euractiv.com (Article 176099).
4 www.environment-agency.gov.uk/business/topics/pollution/112384.aspx.
5 www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/documentation en.htm.
6 www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:149:0069:01:EN:HTML.
7 www.euractiv.com (Article 493637).
8 www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/314.
9 www.ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news 2010092101 en.htm.
10 www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:279:0034:0035:En:PDF.
Table A.4: EU ETS Compliance
Date Event
02.04.2007 Veried emissions
07.06.2007 Compliance data publication
02.04.2007 Veried emissions
23.05.2008 Compliance data publication
01.04.2007 Veried emissions
15.05.2009 Compliance data publication
01.04.2007 Veried emissions
18.05.2010 Compliance data publication
Source: www.ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/monitoring.
Appendix B
Annex for Chapter 3
Renewables and the Power System
Figure B.1: Variable renewable electricity and the power system
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Source: Illustration adapted from Neubarth (2011).
This gure shows how variable renewable electricity inuences the power sys-
tem. First, the variable renewable electricity in-feed poses challenges to the grid
which has to absorb the electricity at any point in time. Currently, the German
transmission grid does not have enough capacity to transport the renewable electric-
ity in-feed southwards. This problem is particularly apparent for wind power which
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is mainly generated in northern Germany but is needed in the south. This implies the
need for massive investment in additional transmission cables. Until these cables are
in place, any electricity that exceeds the demand in northern Germany is exported
to neighbouring countries. Second, the impact on the level and volatility of the
electricity price is studied in Chapter 3. Finally, renewable installations aect the
existing power plants which need to balance the intermittent renewable electricity
in-feed. Gas and coal plants in Germany have to satisfy electricity demand not
met by renewables generation but have to be switched o when enough renewable
electricity is generated.
Marketing Mechanism Before 2010
Figure B.2: Marketing mechanism before 2010
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Note: Illustration adapted from Buchmuller and Schnutenhaus (2009). Blue arrows show the ows
of renewable electricity from the installations to the nal electricity users. Orange arrows indicate
monetary ows that nally remunerate the operators of renewable electricity installations. Source:
Illustration adapted from Buchmuller and Schnutenhaus (2009).
APPENDIX 117
Structural Break Tests
The OLS-Cusum and the Bai-Perron breakpoint strategy are also applied to spec-
ication (B) and (B*) where wind and load are included separately. Results are
shown in Figure B.3 and conrm the previous conclusions. Two main peaks can be
detected, in January 2008 and 2010. The Bai-Perron breakpoint test also indicates
multiple breaks on 22.12.2006, 8.1.2008, 22.12.2008, 6.1.2010. Hence, the structural
break in January 2010 { after the redesign of the renewable electricity marketing {
is conrmed.
Figure B.3: Structural break tests for specication (B) and (B*)
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Note: The upper panels depict the OLS-Cusum test for specication (B) on the left and (B*) on
the right. The lower panels show the respective Bai-Perron breakpoint tests.
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